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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Violence in Public Organizations:  Adapting Contemporary  
Theory to the Case of Schools.  (May 2006) 
Warren Stevens Eller, B.A., West Virginia University;  
M.P.A., West Virginia University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
Violence in American schools has declined significantly over the last two decades 
but still remains an important topic on the public agenda.  This unusual dialectic, driven 
by the recent increase in extreme cases of violence, has fostered a renewed interest and 
scholarship in school violence and public policy focused on reducing this phenomenon.  
At present, schools across the nation are adopting and implementing policies based on 
past research to combat this new wave of school violence; however, the majority of the 
research in this area is limited to evaluations of the immediate problem in a localized 
region, or are a theoretic government reports that focus on correlates over causes and 
offer little guidance for understanding the policy environment. 
This dissertation takes a first pass at large-scale quantitative evaluation of 
violence in schools.  I begin by adapting contemporary policy theory and blending it with 
contextually applicable causal models.  I then test three separate aspects of this policy 
area.  First I examine if institutions do have control over extreme behavior within their 
purview.  Second, I examine the organizational covariates with violence.  Finally, I 
examine the policy system including outputs, effects and actor influence within the 
subsystem.   
  iv 
 
 
I find that schools are not simply victims of the external environment, but victims 
of the political environment.  There are no substantive reductions in violence associated 
with any specific prevention measure; however, there are dramatic consequences when 
school administration or programs focus on this event.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996, Brad and Cassie Bernall pulled their daughter from the school where she 
attended the ninth grade.  The Bernalls were concerned for their daughter’s safety at the 
high school she attended so they transferred her to a new school where their daughter 
would be educated in a safe environment.  Two and a half years later, the Bernall’s 
daughter, Cassie, was a senior at her new high school (Bernall 1999).  Cassie was a good 
student, involved in student activities, the church and popular with her classmates.  One 
of her friends, Justin Boggus, described her as “the kind of girl who was always happy, 
no matter what.  She loved God.  She loved the world (Crowder 1999).” 
The morning of April 20, 1999 started like any other for Cassie.  She woke up in 
the morning and dressed for school, stopping only long enough to say good-bye to her 
mother and pull on her Doc Martin’s before hurrying out the door on her way to school.   
Cassie attended her morning classes as usual, then, during the first lunch break, headed to 
the library to catch up on some homework for her English class.  Crystal and Emily, close 
friends of Cassie’s were in the library working on the very same assignment.  It was 
about eleven o’clock in the morning as Cassie and Emily headed to the back of the library 
to study. Fifteen minutes later, everything in Littleton, Colorado would change forever 
(Bernall 1999). 
 
 
 
 
_______ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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Two calls came in to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s office at the same moment 
that Cassie entered the library in her school.1  The first reported an explosion at one of 
the four major intersections in town.  The second was from a teacher named Peggy at 
Columbine High School.  Peggy identified herself, and reported that there was a student 
with a gun who just shot out a window.  She also stated that when she asked a student in 
the hallway what was going on, he turned and shot at them.  Peggy reported that the 
student standing beside her got hit.  As smoke rolled down the hallway, Peggy hurried all 
the school children to the floor and under the tables for safety (Jefferson County Sheriff’s 
Office 1999). 
In the back of the library, Emily and Cassie hid beneath a table and Cassie began 
praying out loud.  Moments later, Dylan Klebold suddenly slammed his hand on the table 
beneath which the two girls were hiding and yelled “Peek-a-boo (Cullen 1999).”  Without 
saying a word, Klebold shot Cassie at point blank range.  It wasn’t until the next day that 
law enforcement confirmed that Cassie Bernall was killed in the assault on Columbine 
High School (Bernall 1999).2  Cassie was one of thirteen people killed and twenty-one 
wounded in the killing spree executed by two young high school students on that April 
morning. 
Columbine was a special event insomuch as it focused national attention on safety 
in schools, but it is certainly not a unique event.  Multiple homicide attacks in schools are 
currently both a national and most recently international problem.  April 27, 2002, Erfurt 
                                                 
1 The exact times of calls and when students were where is a matter of some dispute.  The many official 
sources of data list different times for identical events, although time lapses on all these sources are very 
similar.  Because the exact moments of these events are not central here, I do not provide them.  
2 There are some inconsistencies surrounding the final events of Cassie’s life.  Several news outlets and a 
best selling book make reference to discourse between Cassie and her killer, but equally reliable outlets 
claim that no words were exchanged.  The strongest evidence suggests that Cassie and her killer exchanged 
no words of consequence, and conversation or not, she is still dead. 
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Germany was the last city to join the dubious club of cities that have been forced to deal 
with school homicide (Infoplease 2002).   
Columbine was a tragedy, but it is not the starting point for this trend of violent 
school deaths.  As tragic as the events on that April morning were, they were not the first 
time the United States dealt with homicide or even multiple homicides in a school 
environment.  Drive by shootings and fights with weapons have plagued schools for a 
long time.  What media pundits claim separate the event at Littleton from other types of 
homicide is that these new events are deliberate, calculated and completely random in 
occurrence.   
Even with this definition, the event at Littleton was not the first.  In February of 
1996, fourteen-year-old Barry Loukaitis walked into his junior high algebra class and 
killed the teacher, two students, and wounded a third.  In October of 1997, sixteen-year-
old Luke Woodham knifed his mother to death before going to school and shooting nine 
students.  In December of that same year, fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal killed three 
students and wounded another five.  These same scenes took place on March 24th in 
Jonesboro, AR; April 24th in Edinboro, PA; May 19th in Fayetteville, TN; and May 21st in 
Springfield, OR in 1998; April 20thin Richmond, VA; and November 16th in Conyers, GA 
in 1999; and on February 29th of 2000 in Mount Morris, MI.  Ages of the perpetrators 
range from six to eighteen, and all these events took place in the school.  More recently, 
shootings have taken place in 2001 on November 12 in Caro, Michigan; in 2002 on 
January 15th in New York, NY; on February 19th in Freising, Germany; on April 14th in 
New Orleans, LA; April 24th in Red Lion, PA; on September 24th in Cold Spring 
Minnesota (KSS 2004).  This brief list is not exhaustive, yet it demonstrates the existence 
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of extreme violence in schools both before and after the incident at Columbine. Between 
1992 and 2001 more than 19 separate events of multiple homicides by children have 
occurred in American schools.   
What This Project Is About  
This manuscript is centered on the overarching question of how is public policy 
focused on organizational violence affecting the larger policy subsystem?  This question 
is addressed in the subsystem of educational policy.  Embedded in this thesis are two 
important sub-questions.  First, is violence in schools actually a phenomenon that can be 
manipulated by the organization, or is this simply a reflection of the larger environment 
over which the school has no control?  Second, given that organizations matter, what is 
the effect of public decisions related to education and violence in schools have on these 
institutions? 
More simply, this project is a look at managing violence in organizations.  Until 
now, extreme violence has been dealt with in three different ways.  First, scholars 
presented individual case studies of extreme violence perpetrators.  Their effort is to 
understand the workings of each individual (or group) of perpetrators.  This approach 
offers detailed analysis of the individuals and individual traits of children who might 
commit an act of extreme violence.  Unfortunately, these types of studies offer little in 
the way of predictive power.  While offering commonalities of dysfunctions is useful in a 
sense, generalizing the knowledge we gain to solutions that do not present huge 
opportunity costs to the organization at hand is difficult. 
The second approach to studying extreme violence examines the victims over the 
short-term and long-term.  Typically, these types of projects deal with the mental and 
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physical ramifications to individuals traumatized by the incident. These studies benefit us 
insomuch as offering policy options for after-event implementation; however, they have 
two major shortfalls.  First, they do not provide any possibilities for prevention.  While 
after-care of victims is extremely important, the best care is prevention of the incident in 
the first place.  Second, they often are very unsophisticated in scope.  Most of these 
studies deal with the immediate victims and the immediate effects of the trauma.  They 
do not, however, deal with the macro costs to both the individuals and the community 
they examine.   
The final approach to studying extreme violence is the application of the prior 
two.  These are the policy papers that generate policy propositions based on the findings 
of case studies of either perpetrators or victims.  These studies usually suggest programs 
without testing outcomes, and those that do test outputs normally test only the rate of 
violence.  While these types of studies offer us some insight as to the absolute 
effectiveness of the programs, they typically offer no leverage in respect to the relative 
effectiveness.  That is, they tell if there is a decrease in the violent events, they do not tell 
us much about the cost of that reduction.  All of these techniques are similar in that they 
deal with individuals.  This project differs in that my main focus is the organization. 
By focusing on the organization, this study provides several advantages over 
individual level studies.  First, individual level solutions must be applied to an individual.  
This means that before a treatment can be administered, an individual at-risk for 
committing extreme violence in schools must be identified.  Identification processes are 
time consuming and require a high degree of expertise to perfect.  When dealing with 
violence, many identification techniques rely on teachers as a primary source of 
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identification and some even depend on student identification of possible offenders.  By 
contrast, organizational level solutions create structures that end or greatly reduce the 
probability of extreme violence in an institution.  These solutions are not individual 
specific insomuch as the treatment does not rely as highly on the skills of an individual.  
Additionally, structural changes are typically less expensive in terms of time and 
resources than individual treatments.  This means that there will be a great savings in 
resources that can be devoted to education.   
Second, organizational level solutions are, by definition, implemented at a higher 
level within the school.  This means that there are less “links” in the implementation 
chain.  Fewer links means that there are fewer places where the implementation can 
breakdown.  Finally, organizational level solutions represent a more top-down policy 
process than does an individual level solution.  Maintaining a top-down approach serves 
to limit the numbers of areas where policy can be influenced by other groups (Dye 2001).  
It maintains a logical flow through a hierarchical organization, and can be applied more 
easily to a hierarchical bureaucracy than can an individual, bottom-up approach.  
Theory for theory sake is fine; however, school violence is an area where the 
nature of the social dysfunction demands theory that is applicable.  For this reason, I 
approach this project with two key theoretic goals: First, I review theories of why 
extreme behaviors manifest themselves to determine which of these theories is useful at 
the organizational level.  I then address how these manifestations are theoretically 
manipulated at the agency level, and how the outcomes are produced by that 
manipulation.  The theory that is most valuable is the theory that can be broadly applied 
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at the organizational level and not theory that must be implemented at the individual 
level. 
Why Study Schools? 
There are many good reasons to study schools.  Schools are a place where we 
send our children with the expectation that they will be educated, protected and 
supervised.  Public education represents an agreement between government and 
electorate that implies in return for tax contributions, government will produce educated 
youths able to assume a productive role in society at some given point.  Aside from this 
normative argument for studying schools, there are also several important theoretical 
components to this line of inquiry. 
Schools represent the largest segment of the bureaucracy; and because they are 
the most prolific singular manifestation of the bureaucracy, schools are the most common 
point source for policy implementation in America.  These two facts mean that research 
of school policy allows us to gain insight to both organizations and policy 
implementation.   
Several policy scholars3 seem to generally accept this notion that schools are 
bureaucracies and are generalizable to other governmental organizations; however, 
political science research seems to ignore this fact.  Political science of late seems to 
ignore the importance of schools in the systematic study of bureaucracy.  Many important 
works in the systematic study of bureaucracy have been based in educational settings.  
Weber (1946) identifies several key characteristics of bureaucracy.  Task specialization, 
                                                 
3 For example:  Wilson 1987; Anderson 1997; Peters 1996; Rushefsky 1990; Cochran & Malone 1995; Dye 
1988.  This list is not inclusive, and only represents textbooks that include education policy as a 
generalizable form of public policy.  This does not include several texts on education policy specifically 
nor numerous journal articles on the subject specifically. 
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hierarchical structure, reliance on standard operating procedures, standardization and 
objective-based positions.    Obviously schools fit these most basic requirements of 
bureaucracy.   Blau (1956) espouses a somewhat more liberal view of bureaucracies.  He 
states “The type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks 
by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals is called a bureaucracy” 
(14).  He continues, “Bureaucracy is not confined to the military and civilian branches of 
the government, but is also found in business, unions, churches, universities, and even in 
baseball” (14).  Additionally, Wilson (1989) begins his seminal work on bureaucracy 
with examples of what he terms “three common and important kinds of government 
organizations” (10).  Wilson’s triad includes armies, prisons and schools.   
In addition to being typical and common bureaucracies, schools also maintain an 
important role in public policy.  Peters (1993) briefly addresses the importance of schools 
in American public policy.  He highlights the important court cases such as Brown v. 
Board of Education, the distinct federalism questions inherent to education, and 
contemporary issues in education policy that are reflexive of traditional American values.  
Peters is only one of a long list of policy analysts that have utilized education policy to 
evaluate American policy as a whole.  Schools are a bountiful medium for the study of 
policy and bureaucratic politics.  
Why Study Violence in Schools? 
This gruesome timetable of extreme violence offered in the first couple 
paragraphs does not tell the whole story behind school violence.  While the purpose of 
this project is to examine this phenomenon, the escalation in the level of brutality of 
violence in schools is not indicative of the actual levels of violence in our schools (DoED 
  9 
 
 
1999).  In actuality, the National Center for Education Statistics' indicators of School 
Crime and Safety 2000 reports the number of serious violent crimes and theft has 
declined since 1992.   Additionally, a survey of students who have been victims of school 
crime and violence showed a decrease from ten percent to eight percent since 1995 
(Canady, Stark and Naumann 2001).  A Study by the US Department of Education found 
that “overall school crime, including theft, rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated 
assault, and simple assault declined by one third between 1992 and 1998 (DeVoe, et al. 
2004).” 
While actual numbers of violent and non-violent acts have decreased in American 
schools, public opinion has not reacted in kind.  In Texas, more than ninety percent of 
individuals surveyed consider school violence a serious problem.  Furthermore, eighty-
two percent said they were worried that a school shooting similar to the one in Santee, 
CA could occur in their neighborhood (Markley 2001).   Jay Tarrow describes this as a 
case where we do not have an epidemic of violence, but one of fear (Markley 2001).   
A 1998 national survey of 15,877 middle and high school students found that 
more than one in three students do not feel safe at school (Josephson Institute of Ethics 
2001).  Similarly, the Add Health study of 10,000 high school students from 134 schools 
across the country reported that more than one of every four students surveyed had 
carried a gun or knife in the past year.  The Center for Disease Control’s 1999 Youth 
Risk Behavior Surveillance project reported that between two and sixteen percent of 
students felt too unsafe to go to school and that seventeen percent had carried a weapon 
in the past 30 days (Miller & Chandler 2003).   
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Cursory evidence would suggest that the problem of violence in schools is one we 
have in hand, that now all that remains is the publicity problem.  This statement is not 
entirely true.  Although schools are safer than they were just a decade ago, we must 
decide if the current levels of violence are acceptable.  In other words, have we reached a 
point where the total amount of violence is a reasonable tradeoff for the other products 
we receive from schools?  If the answer to this is no, then there are two important 
problems.  First, the levels of violence are escalating.  While the actual number of violent 
acts is dropping, the severity is on the rise and the public has taken notice.  The fear 
created by the attention given to the severity of recent violence in schools has obviously 
led students to participate in behaviors that increase the probability of violence.  If a good 
student carries a knife because he does not feel safe, then there is an inherently greater 
probability that that knife will be used than if it were left at home. 
For instance, an unarmed student who is picked on is being bullied.  This student 
can either fight back or flee.  This situation is certainly bad; however, this is a state of 
affairs that can be resolved without the loss of life. On the other hand, an armed student 
who is being picked on has the option to flee, to fight back or escalate the level of 
violence.  In the first scenario the probability of a weapon being used is zero while in the 
second scenario the probability is something greater than zero.  While we cannot 
accurately estimate the overall probability change for the likelihood, it is certainly 
significantly greater than zero.4 When we talk specifically about firearms, there are 
additional hazards.   
                                                 
4 To estimate the actual change in likelihood, we would need to have accurate numbers for how many times 
students carried weapons and how many times they resorted to those weapons in the face of a threat.  There 
is no way to accurately generate these data. 
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The old saying, “guns don’t kill people, people kill people,” is not always exactly 
correct.  Roughly three percent of all gun homicides are a result of an accident.  Because 
guns provide an individual with the ability to project a tremendous amount of power over 
distance,5 they also provide a greater hazard than traditional mêlée weapons.  
Additionally, because firearms are more mechanically complex than knives or clubs, they 
require both greater skill and maintenance to keep them from accidentally causing an 
injury.  Accidental deaths by firearms are a fact.6  Three Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company studies found that 27 percent of accidental shootings came from playing with a 
weapon and 12 percent came from examining or demonstrating a weapon (Kleck 1997; 
MLIC 1968).  If guns are not present in schools, than these behaviors could never 
happen.            
Second, the increased attention has caused a great number of new policies and 
procedures to be adopted by schools in an effort to reduce the possibility of extreme 
violence.  Currently, schools are so under-funded that teachers are compensated poorly, 
buildings are in disrepair and non-fixed assets are diminishing.  Every dollar diverted to 
programs designed to combat violence further reduces the resources schools have to 
educate children.  This means that we will not see the opportunity costs of these violence 
programs until the damage is too far-gone.    
                                                 
5 The average .45-caliber ammunition is loaded with a 230-grain projectile with a muzzle velocity of about 
850 feet per second and about 370ft/lbs of energy at the muzzle and 305ft/lbs at 100 yards.  The 9mm 
cartridge with a 124-grain projectile making about 1120 ft/sec at the muzzle produces 345 ft/lbs of energy 
at the muzzle and 255ft/lbs at 100 yards.  The .22 caliber rim fire with a 30-grain bullet making 2200ft/sec 
at the muzzle produces 325ft/lbs of energy at the muzzle and 120ft/lbs at 100 yards. For comparison, a 
study of police shootings has found a 94% one-shot-stop (OSS) rate for the .45 and a 90% OSS for the 
9mm (Marshal and Sandow 1992).  While data are not available for the .22, this was sufficient to render 
Jim Brady permanently incapacitated.           
6 There is a large number of studies that evaluate the probability of accidental deaths by firearms.  This 
said, the majority of the empirical evidence on both sides is sufficiently flawed as to render any projections 
useless.  There is no doubt, however, that presence over absence of weapons increases the likelihood of 
shootings.   
  12 
 
 
Resources such as teacher time, educational funding, administrative support and 
community/parent support are finite in nature.  Every hour a teacher spends filling out 
student reports is one hour that cannot be used for developing lectures.  A hand held 
metal detector costs about $200 and a walk through detector roughly $5000;7 this means 
that we give up several textbooks for each hand-held unit or four state-of-the-art 
computers for each walk through detector.  The benefits we give up each time we choose 
a particular security option are every bit as important as the security measure we choose.  
This is not to say that cost is the only measure we should use, only that as recourses 
become scarce, option cost becomes more closely linked with all the outcomes of the 
organization.             
How This Project Is Laid Out   
The data for this project come from several sources and cover the state of Texas.  
Some of the data used also include all states in the US.  The U.S. Census bureau’s 2000 
Census CD provides demographic data.  In May 2002, a survey was sent to all school 
district superintendents in the states of Texas and Florida.  This survey included measures 
of violence, expenditures for programs targeting violence, interest groups, policies for 
reducing violence, and student body composition.  The Department of Education in both 
Texas and Florida provided indicators of school violence for 1995 through the present.  
Finally, the Center for Disease Control provided copies of the 2000 School Health 
Policies and Programs Study and the 2000 Youth Risk Behavior Assessment Study.  
These data are merged on the school district level to provide a data set containing basic 
demographics, school characteristics, levels of violence and policies and attitudes at the 
organizational level.    
                                                 
7 Prices are taken from a brief review of web sites offering similar products.   
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Environmental Roots of Violence evaluates the extent to which violence in 
schools is the product of external forces.  If violence within the school is merely a 
function of the violence in the surrounding community, then there is no reason to expect 
the organization to effect change in the level of violence.  This chapter begins by 
evaluating the extant theory of violence and derives a theoretically based model of 
violence in schools as a function of the surrounding community to assess the contribution 
of the external environment on organizational violence.  This chapter asks the first of half 
of one of the basic questions in this manuscript; is it just the environment?    
Organizational Control of Violence compares and evaluates the effect of 
organizational control mechanisms on the levels of violence in the organization as they 
pertain to schools.  As the previous chapter identifies the portion of violence created by 
forces external to the organization, this chapter examines and identifies the portion of 
organizational violence that can be attributed to the organizational structure and control.  
This chapter specifically identifies which mechanisms are most relevant for 
organizational managers in the formulation of control structures for mediating violence in 
organizations. 
The Policy Process of Violence in Schools provides the theoretical and historical 
background for the remainder of this project.  It begins with an overview of the history of 
school violence in America.  I then lay the theoretic groundwork necessary for later 
chapters.  This chapter specifically addresses why and how schools fit into the policy 
process, and organizational and institutional theory necessary for applying the results of 
the following chapters to schools by theoretically adapting the Advocacy Coalitions 
Framework to provide expectations across subsystems and with aggregate data.  
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Additionally, this chapter spends some time hypothesizing about what the ACF should 
tell us about unstable systems. In the conclusion, I wrap the findings from the empirical 
work in the next chapter into an exploratory evaluation of how these expectations of the 
ACF fit with the current data and how and why this course should be expanded upon. 
The Policy Subsystem: Players, Policies and Outcomes  evaluates the policy 
system and outcomes of programs derived from case study literature.  This chapter begins 
with evaluation of the decision-making stream leading to the adoption of policies, then 
evaluates the effect of these policies within the schools.  Typically, governmental 
organizations evaluate the utility of micro-level programs in schools with macro-level 
indicators of student behavior.  Many Department of Education reports claim that new 
efforts to reduce violence are successful based only on the national and state level trends 
in violence in schools.  This chapter evaluates overall policy effects of violence control 
programs in a much more sophisticated manner to control for spuriousness that may be 
present in the typically parochial modeling offered by government agencies. 
The Conclusion brings together the three areas covered in the empirical review of 
school violence.  This chapter discusses the implications of the origins of violence policy, 
the outputs and outcomes of policies, and management techniques for dealing with 
violence in organizations.  This chapter concludes with policy recommendations specific 
to schools and more broadly for organizations in general. 
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 CHAPTER II 
ENVIRONMENTAL ROOTS OF VIOLENCE:   
TESTING THE COMMUNITY EFFECT 
 Schools are microcosms of the community in which they dwell, and a large part 
of school violence can be predicted from the violence within the community (Reiss and 
Roth 1993).  That is because the factors that drive deviant behavior in a community are 
the same as those that drive this behavior in every subsystem of the community.  Schools 
represent a sub-sample of the community population within a confined institution, and 
that sub-sample will be subject to the same pathologies present in the larger population.  
This is fortunate as there have been relatively few comprehensive studies of violence in 
schools (Laub and Lauritsen 2001).  Unfortunately, we can not expect all violence within 
schools to be a direct product of the neighborhood in which the school is located.  This is 
true for several reasons; first, school districts are not necessarily congruent with 
jurisdictional boundaries of cities, police districts or general zoning districts. Second, 
school bussing policies may mean that a significant portion of students in a given school 
are from areas away from the community which houses the school. Third, I expect 
schools will have an effect on the levels of violence within the school.  This last 
difference between violence in schools and the surrounding community is possibly the 
most complex and certainly the most important because if schools do not have an effect, 
then neither will school policy nor this study.  This chapter will expressly examine the 
influence of community violence on the school environment.  
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Why Schools Matter 
 Ecological systems theory (Lewin 1935, 1951; Bronfenbrenner 1977, 1979; 
Hobbs 1966; Garbarino 1982; Garbarino et al. 1992) states that there are four inseparable, 
interconnected systems that shape human development.  It is the interaction between 
these systems, or contexts, which dictate type of adult the system produces.  These 
systems are the microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem and the macrosystem. The 
microsystems are defined as those direct interactions between the child and the 
immediate environment (Astor, Pitner and Duncan 1996).  More specifically, 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) defines a microsystem as, “a pattern of activities, roles and 
interpersonal relations experienced by the developing person in a given setting with 
particular physical and material characteristics” (p.22).  Astor, Pitner and Duncan (1996) 
List school, the neighborhood, the family and the community as typical microsystems in 
the development of youth.  Thinking about microsystems as sets, we can define the 
mesosystem as the intersection of the microsystems.  That is the “persons who participate 
actively in both settings, intermediate links in a social network, formal and informal 
communications among settings, and, again clearly in the phenomenological domain, the 
extent and nature of knowledge and attitudes existing in one setting about the other” 
(Bronfenbrenner 1979, p.25).  
 The exosystems are the settings that do not involve the child as an active 
participant, however, still host events that affect the setting containing the child.  Some 
examples include school board decisions, events in a teacher’s life, or changes in a 
parental microsystem (Astor, Pitner and Duncan 1996).  Finally, the macrosystem “are 
the overall structural patterns in which a child lives and grows” (Astor, Pitner and 
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Duncan 1996, p.342).  This includes the economy, laws and political events.  Given this 
theory of development, it is easy to see how schools can impact violent behavior in 
children, as they are a microsystem in which children participate more than any other 
with the exception of the home. 
 Children develop in set microsystems.  There is little that schools can do to affect 
the home or community in the short run; however, the school system itself can serve to 
temper the outcomes of home and community systems on the developing child.  Laub and 
Lauritsen (2001) indicate that it is important to assess the impact of specific 
microsystems in respect to the other microsystems in the environment.  In other words, to 
identify school specific contexts that either inhibit or exacerbate violence, we need to 
view school violence in respect to the additional contexts which play a role in the 
process.  
Factors That Span Contexts 
 There are several factors that contribute to the likelihood that children will 
participate in violent acts.  These can be broken down into two specific groups, 
physiological and environmental.  Englander (2003) lists the physiological factors which 
lead to violence as, “perinatal problems, head injuries, and childhood disorders Attention-
Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder8” (p.124).   
Physiological Factors 
 In 1911, Cesare Lombroso put fourth the first modern biological theory of 
criminality.  Since that time, researchers have established strong links between 
                                                 
8 References deleted include: Perinatal problems (Kandel 1989; Kandel and Mednick 1991; Lewis et al. 
1979; Mednick et al. 1971), head injuries (Lewis et al. 1986; Lewis et al 1979; Rosenbaum and Hoge 
1989), and childhood disorders (Ellis 1991; Fergusson and Horwood 1995; Halperin and Newcorn 1997; 
Zagar et al. 1990; Jacobvitz and Sroufe 1987; Kandel and Mednick 1989; Zagar et al. 1989). 
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physiological and biological factors and behavioral disorders (Brennan et al 1995).  First, 
there appears to be a strong link indicating that individuals may have a genetic propensity 
for antisocial behavior.  Studies indicate that the single best predictor of a child’s 
likelihood of criminal behavior is the father’s criminal behavior (Robins 1966; See also: 
Brennan et al. 1995; Cloninger and Guze 1970; Glueck and Glueck 1974; McCord and 
McCord 1958; West and Farrington 1977).  Similarly, studies of twin behavior seem to 
support this theory.  Lange found that 77% pairwise concordance for criminality in 
monozygotic twins and only 12% pairwise concordance in dizygotic twins.  Similar 
studies in eight other countries find similar results (Brennan et al. 1995; See also 
Christiansen 1977a; Christiansen 1977b; Dalgaard and Kringlen 1976).  Additionally, 
more methodologically rigorous studies of twin behavior have not been able to reject the 
hypothesis of genetic propensity for criminal behavior in favor of a purely environmental 
model (Rowe 1983). Furthermore, several studies of adoptees indicate that the child’s 
likelihood of antisocial behavior correlates to that of the biological father (Mednick et al.  
1984; see also Bohman et al 1982; Cadoret et al. 1985; Cadoret 1987; Cloninger et al 
1982; Crowe 1974; Sigvardsson et al. 1982).   
Parents can have effects that are not solely attributable to hereditary factors.  
Perinatal and neurodevelopmental also play a role in the social development of a child.  
Research suggests that prematurity, low birth weight, neonatal seizures and pregnancy 
complications correlate with behavior disorders in children (Pasamanick et al. 1956; 
Mungas 1983); however, Brennan, Mednick and Volavka (1995), state that current 
research suggests that delivery complications appear to be more predictive than low birth 
weight or premature birth.     Many scholars attribute the correlations between birth 
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complications to damage to the brain from anoxia and physical injury (Werner 1987).  
Additionally, a large body of work indicates that neurochemichal factors and some 
physiological factors may also increase an individual’s likelihood of criminal behavior.  
Reduced levels of cerebrospinal fluid and poor autonomic reactions have also been linked 
to violent behavior (Brennan et al. 1995). 
Environmental Factors 
 One of the most important environmental indicators of crime in general is the 
economy.  Hale and Sabbagh (1991) find positive correlation between crime and the 
previous year’s unemployment rate in Great Brittan.  Additional studies have replicated 
this finding in the US (Russell 1994).  Specific labor market indicators such as poverty 
have also been fruitful in predicting overall crime levels in the macro-environment 
(Freeman 1983; Chiricos 1987), and Land, McCall and Cohen (1990) find that poverty 
seems to covary with homicide.  A vast body of literature also exists which replicates 
these findings on the individual level.9  In addition to the economy, there are several 
other environmental factors related to crime that stem from the community. 
 Research indicates that high levels of population turnover reduce social 
delinquency (Freeman 1995; Shaw & McKay 1969).  High levels of mobility have been 
associated with increased levels of violent crime (Block 1979; Sampson 1985, 1986; 
Smith and Jarjoura 1988; Taylor and Covington 1988).  High levels of population 
heterogeneity alone and in conjunction with relative economic depravation have been 
shown to correlate with violent crime (Balkwell 1990; Kornhauser 1978).  Population and 
population density both correlate with violent crime in neighborhoods (Roncek 1981; 
Scherman and Kobrin 1986; Sampson and Lauritsen 1994).   
                                                 
9 See Freeman (1995) for a listing. 
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Community structure, or lack thereof, can also play a significant role in crime and 
violent crime in neighborhoods.  Social capital has been demonstrated to be in integral 
part of community development (Putnam 1993) and is also found to be an important 
covariate with violent crime.  Taylor, Gottfredson and Brower (1984) find that social ties 
to the community in both word and deed covary with levels of violent crime.  Simcha-
Fagan and Schwartz (1986) find a significant negative relationship between delinquency 
and organizational participation (Sampson 1995). 
Controlling for Extra-Scholastic Covariates of Deviance 
It is clear that the relationship between the environment and violent crime is 
complex.  While this list is formidable, it is by no means an exhaustive list of the prior 
research done between the macro-environment and violent crime. Clearly these 
relationships can be modeled, however, any attempt to model each of these complex 
factors in a single model would be futile at best.  Setting aside the problems with 
obtaining accurate measures of each of the above factors, the colinearity alone in any 
single model fitting all these covariates would wash away any useful information we 
might hope to gain from the exercise.  To avoid this problem I begin this investigation of 
school violence by predicting the levels of violence in schools as a function of violence in 
the surrounding community. This technique offers two major benefits over trying to fit a 
model of school violence that accounts for these factors; accuracy and parsimony. 
First, this approach will control for all sources of community violence, not merely 
those for which I can identify proxies.  This is important because without a very strong 
model of community violence, there is no way to isolate the school effects on violent 
behavior.  By using the actual data for community violent crime, I circumvent the 
  21 
  
 
problem of identifying every source of community variation.  This argument only stands 
if the school and community accurately reflect one another.      
Measures of School Violence 
 Currently there are no nationally available data on crime or violent acts in 
schools.  There exist some small subsets of national samples, and some survey samples of 
student reported violence, but there is no single archive of these data that include the 
entire population of the nation.  There are, however, several states that have made an 
effort to collect data on violence and crimes in schools.  Texas, Florida and North 
Carolina are among the many states that have begun to monitor violence in their school 
districts, and there is a national movement at the state level to standardize these data 
across all states.  Examination of the data collection techniques and communication with 
several of the state agencies currently collecting data on school violence indicates that 
pooling these data would be ill advised.  As there is no standard definition for many of 
the types of data, nor uniform reporting standards or procedures, any assumption of 
exchangeability between these state level measures would be heroic at best.   
 Given the state of data collection on violence in schools, I evaluate only Texas 
data.  While other states have comparable, and in some cases better datasets, Texas 
provides the most diverse area with the greatest amount of observations and variance 
between observations.  There are some drawbacks to utilizing the Texas school violence 
data.  First, Texas blanks any counts of 5 or less to ensure anonymity of the perpetrators 
and victims.  This means that for any count of five or less, they include a code that 
indicates occurrence but not frequency.  Even at the district level, this means that there 
are a large number of truncated counts.  Additionally, because the State has such fine 
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gradation in the measurement system, each individual classification of violence or crime 
suffers in relation to the gradation of the measure and “popularity” of the act.  For 
instance, Texas tracks eight classifications of assault, but only one measure of tobacco 
possession.  Because Assault is so finely measured, the counts have a staggeringly large 
proportion of blanked counts. 
Texas School Violence 
 Texas tracks 38 indicators of crime and violence in schools.  These include: 
Disruptive Behavior, Conduct Punishable as a Felony, Assault or Terroristic Threat, 
Controlled Substances/Drugs, Alcohol Violation, Abuse of Glue or Aerosol Paint, Public 
Lewdness/Indecent Exposure, Retaliation against District Employee, Off-Campus Title 5 
Felony, Off-Campus non Title 5 Felony, Firearm Violation, Illegal Knife, Club, 
Prohibited Weapon, Aggravated Assault/Aggravated Sexual Assault, Arson, 
Murder/Attempted Murder, Indecency with a Child, Aggravated Kidnapping, 
Serious/Persistent Misconduct, Violated Local Code of Conduct, Criminal Mischief, 
Emergency Placement/Expulsion, Other Code of Conduct Reason, Hearing 
Office/Student with a Disability, Terroristic Threat, Assault-District Employee, Assault-
Non-District Employee, Sexual Assault-District Employee, Sexual Assault-Non-District 
Employee, Tobacco, School-Related Gang Violence, False Alarm/False Report, Felony-
Controlled Substance Violation, Felony-Alcohol Violation, and Other.   Of these 38 
indicators, eleven have no variation for the years 1998 to 2002.  These include: Assault or 
Terroristic Threat, Club, Aggravated Assault/Aggravated Sexual Assault, 
Murder/Attempted Murder, Aggravated Kidnapping, Other Code of Conduct Reason, 
Hearing Office/Student with Disability, Sexual Assault-District Employee, False 
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Alarm/False Report, Felony Controlled Substance, and Felony Alcohol Violation.  This 
does not mean that the events represented by these indicators have not occurred, just that 
the frequency was less than five for any given year.  The descriptive statistics for the 
remaining 27 indicators appear in Table 2.1. 
The descriptive statistics for the data available indicate that many of the indicators 
have relatively few occurrences.  This lack of variability will make predicting these 
events problematic.  Intuitively, it also seems that some of the more typical violations 
listed are rather low.  For example, there are several organizations that have been 
established to discourage drinking at proms, athletic events and other school activities.  In 
light of all the attention to underage drinking, it hardly seems possible that there were 
only 109 occurrences of alcohol in all Texas schools over the four year time represented 
in the data. It is apparent all of these indicators are underreported, and that many of the 
“less important” indicators may be discounted even more so than most.  Bearing this in 
mind, I treat these data as indicators of underlying behaviors as opposed to true counts of 
events.  Aside form this aforementioned lack of variance and underreporting, there are 
several other important problems that arise when dealing with multiple measures of 
related events.  That is the interrelationships between the measures.  
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics of School Violence 
 
Indicator Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Number of 
    Deviation Count Count Observations 
Disruptive Behavior 192.07 699.05 0 12036 4156 
Conduct Punishable as a Felony 0.99 6.26 0 153 4156 
Controlled Substance/Drugs 11.76 38.47 0 500 4156 
Alcohol Violation 2.23 7.25 0 109 4156 
Abuse of Glue or Aerosol Paint 0.16 1.51 0 23 4156 
Public Lewdness/Indecent Exposure 0.54 6.01 0 180 4156 
Retaliation Against a District Employee 0.16 1.32 0 24 4156 
Off-Campus Title 5 Felony 0.36 2.72 0 44 4156 
Off-Campus Non-Title 5 Felony 0.44 3.70 0 92 4156 
Firearm Violation 0.08 0.98 0 19 4156 
Illegal Knife 0.53 2.97 0 54 4156 
Prohibited Weapon 0.51 5.52 0 165 4156 
Arson 0.04 0.59 0 12 4156 
Indecency with a Child 0.01 0.32 0 9 4156 
Serious/Persistent Misconduct 4.74 21.38 0 402 4156 
Violated Local Code of Conduct 450.28 1424.73 0 26446 4156 
Criminal Mischief 2.25 12.96 0 235 4156 
Emergency Placement/Expulsion 0.12 1.89 0 46 4156 
Terroristic Threat 1.45 6.60 0 81 4156 
Assault-District Employee 1.05 5.80 0 83 4156 
Assault-Non District Employee 4.28 21.48 0 408 4156 
Aggravated Assault-District Employee 0.02 0.36 0 6 4156 
Aggravated Assault-Non District Employee 0.17 1.75 0 32 4156 
Sexual Assault-Non District Employee 0.01 0.32 0 9 4156 
Tobacco 5.27 19.27 0 226 4156 
School-Related Gang Violence 0.63 4.70 0 78 4156 
Other 1.51 16.61 0 386 4156 
 
Many measures are simply aggregates of other measures.  For instance, the count for 
prohibited weapons violations is strongly correlated with the measures for firearms 
violations, and possession of an illegal knife.   Additionally, some measures have a 
completely different relationship with one another.  As opposed to being similar 
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measures of the same behavior, there are those counts which represent substitutes for one 
another.  Recall that these counts are official records of student acts of deviance within 
each school district, and the data represented by each count is also a reflection of the 
definition of the act implemented by the local school bureaucrat.  Several of these 
indicators are strongly negatively correlated, representing one of two possibilities.  For 
example, there is a strong negative correlation between “assault on a district employee” 
and “retaliation against a district employee.”  Either some of these deviant acts are 
negatively related or some districts are more likely to choose the lesser stringent 
classification than the more stringent classification of the act.  As it hardly seems 
plausible that schools with high incidents of assault on a district employee would have 
reduced rates of retaliation against district employees, I assume that these are separate 
counts of equivalent acts.  While this assumption seems reasonable, I eliminate all 
measures that appear to be or repeat counts.  Additionally, I further reduce the number of 
indicators by eliminating any counts that are clearly labeled as “off-campus” events.  This 
leaves ten remaining indicators of school violence for the Texas school districts.   
Reducing the number of considered indicators, I have increased the reliability of 
the counts at hand; however, there are still problems with having ten indicators.  Most 
importantly, these indicators are merely counts of behaviors.  While the behaviors 
themselves are interesting, the underlying motives of these behaviors are what are more 
important.  To assess these, I examine the remaining indicators using principal-
component factor analysis to search for underlying commonalities in the data. 
  26 
  
 
Identifying the Factors Driving Deviant Actions 
Acts of violence in schools can sometimes seem to be random occurrences; 
however, this is far from fact.  Many forms of deviance are driven by the same factors.  
Unfortunately, these factors are often not identifiable and nearly impossible to quantify.  
For example, a student who feels alienated may vandalize the school, have serious 
problems with misconduct of disruptive behavior, and in the worst case scenario commit 
heinous acts of violence.  This does not mean that every case of vandalism or misconduct 
is the result of alienation, only that these multiple indicators may often be multiple signs 
of some latent condition.  More troubling is the fact that there is no way to accurately 
count the number of students who feel alienated at any given time, and worse yet, there is 
no way to identify which alienated students may exhibit a deviant act as a result of this 
alienation.  For policy to be effective in such cases, it is the underlying condition that 
must be identified and addressed.  The most common technique for identifying and 
quantifying latent factors common with identifiable indicators is factor analysis.  This 
technique identifies factors that represent correlation common across variables and 
generates scores for the factors for each observation.  Before reducing the data using 
factor analysis, I first convert all the counts to rates per student by dividing each indicator 
by the district enrollment.  This prevents correlations in the data caused by sheer size of 
the school.  Next, I use factor analysis to identify which of these indicators are best suited 
together.   
Factor analysis is a blanket term used to describe a family of data reduction 
techniques that all search for commonalities within data.  These techniques use linear 
combinations of the observed data to create fewer indicators that summarize the 
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information presented in the observed data.  By nature, factors created using these 
techniques are orthogonal, that is uncorrelated with one another.  Theoretically, when 
dealing with multiple latent roots of violence, the assumption of orthogonal factors seems 
untenable.  Factor analysis does allow for oblique rotation of factors after the initial 
extraction; however, this technique can be quite problematic to replicate.  For this reason, 
I use factor analysis as an exploratory tool, grouping sets of factors in sets using the 
original factor solution. I then run one-shot factor reductions on the sets of factors I 
identify to generate the factor scores representing the levels of violence within schools.  
The first extracted factor, which I label Student Focused Violence (SFV) is based on six 
variables which all indicate deviant behavior within schools.  The factor loadings for SFV 
appear in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Factor Loadings for Student Focused Violence 
 
Variable SFV Factor Uniqueness 
Illegal Knife 0.591 0.651 
Prohibited Weapon 0.675 0.544 
Criminal Mischief 0.513 0.737 
Terroristic Threat 0.572 0.672 
Gang Violence 0.384 0.853 
Assault-Non-District 
Employee 0.685 0.530 
 
Each of the counts used in creating this measure deal with types of violence or deviant 
acts that are predominantly focused on the school, or the students.  The second extracted 
factor, which I label Teacher Focused Violence (TFV) is based on just two variables.  
The factor loadings for TFV appear in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
Factor Loadings for Teacher Focused Violence 
 
Variable TFV Factor Uniqueness 
Assault- District Employee 0.764 0.416 
Aggravated Assault-District 
Employee 0.764 0.416 
 
 
Pearson Correlations Assault Ag. Assault 
Assault- District Employee 1  
Aggravated Assault-District Employee 0.1686 1 
 
The counts used here are of actions taken directly against teachers, principals and other 
district employees.  Certainly acts focused on the authority figures in the organization are 
more severe in nature.  This can easily be seen by the infrequency of occurrence (see 
table 2.4). These two measures, SFV and TFV, will be used as indicators of latent 
violence levels within the schools.  Now, the interesting question is what causes these 
levels of violence against students and teachers?  The first step in examining this question 
is to evaluate the outside environment, as theory clearly indicates that the environment 
should have some control over the violence in the schools.      
 Estimating Environmental Violence 
 The Texas Department of Public Safety provided incidence and arrest rates for 
seven different types of crimes for each police department in the State of Texas for the 
year 2000.  These are: Murder, Rape, Robbery, Assault, Burglary, Larceny, and Auto 
Theft.  As with the school counts, these indicators are divided by the general population 
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to ensure correlations are not a function of population.  Descriptive statistics for these 
incident rates per 1000 population appear in Table 2.410. 
Table 2.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Community Violence 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Murder 0.044 0.057 0.000 0.555 
Rape 0.303 0.231 0.000 1.447 
Robbery 0.521 0.651 0.000 3.539 
Assault 2.497 1.610 0.000 10.082 
Burglary 7.049 3.248 0.000 18.275 
Larceny 20.063 12.461 0.000 51.073 
Auto Theft 1.988 1.781 0.000 10.279 
 
These data differ from the school district data in that these are actual counts and no 
values have been blanked, however, these data are similar in that these counts probably 
systematically underestimate the actual numbers of crime in the area.  This problem is not 
unique to Texas data by any means.  In fact, the crime literature is riddled with references 
to the discrepancies between official department counts, victimization studies and the true 
underlying crime levels in given areas of the country.  The most readily accessible 
evidence of this trend in crime data can be found in the Criminal Victimization in the 
United States report by the US Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000).   I apply factor 
analysis to these data to identify underlying patterns in the data to prevent problems with 
colinearity in the data.   Initial analysis indicates that Murder and Rape rates do not fit 
well with the other indicators.  The resulting factor loadings are listed in table 2.5. 
These data are now used to predict the level of violence in the schools focused on 
teachers and students. 
                                                 
10 These data have been aggregated by school district, so the count reflects the number of school districts as 
opposed to the number of reporting departments. 
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Table 2.5 
Factor Loadings for Community Violence 
 
Variable CVR Uniqueness 
Robbery 0.880 0.225 
Assault 0.808 0.347 
Burglary 0.851 0.275 
Larceny 0.889 0.210 
Auto Theft 0.897 0.196 
 
Estimating the Effect of Community Violence 
 The community violence factor, murder rate and rape rate for the school 
communities are used to predict separately the levels of violence indicated by the student 
and teacher focused violence measures for the school districts.  The results are presented 
in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 
Regressions of School Violence with Community Violence 
 
Dependent Variable: Student Focused Violence  Teacher Focused Violence 
        
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t   Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t 
Community Violence 0.246 0.017 14.6  0.109 0.018 6.2
Murder Rate -0.123 0.270 -0.5  0.253 0.281 0.9
Rape Rate -0.154 0.071 -2.2  -0.075 0.074 
-
1.0
Constant 0.046 0.029 1.6  0.009 0.030 0.3
Number of 
Observations  4128    4128  
F  81.18    15.91  
Probability of F  0    0  
Adjusted R-squared  0.0551    0.0107  
Root MSE  0.95483    0.99426  
 
Table 2.6 shows a weak relationship between the community violence index and the 
school violence indicators.  This relationship is positive as expected; however, the 
relationship only explains five percent of the total variance.  Worse yet, the community 
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violence indicator only explains about one percent of the violence focused on teachers.  
Additionally, murder and rape do not significantly covary with the two measures of 
violence in schools.  These findings have three possible explanations: First, the measures 
can be completely incorrect and therefore produce no results.  Second, because the 
community measures are based on total crime a community measure of youth crime may 
be in order.  Finally, the violence in the community may just be a bad predictor of 
violence in schools. 
 Typically, the Department of Justice crime index is used to measure the level of 
crime for a given area.  This index is an additive scale of the exact types of crimes I use 
in the current measure.  Because the data do not include the same classifications as the 
typical crime index, I chose to use a factor score instead of making a partial index.  Taken 
individually, none of the given indicators performs better than this measure.  
Additionally, if each type of violent act in schools is modeled individually against each 
individual type of community crime using count data models, the predictions are not 
better.  This is most likely because crime statistics are not exact counts, but are actually 
measures.  For instance, the majority of rape goes unreported.  Comparisons between the 
uniform crime reports maintained by the FBI and every victimization survey shows huge 
discrepancies between the numbers of actual reports (see Kleck 1998).  Given that the 
counts cannot be assumed to be actual counts, the numbers must be understood as a 
representation of the relative level of crime.  Additionally, varying techniques of 
modeling the data do not improve fit nor predictive power.   
 The most plausible explanation remaining then is that the effects of the exosystem 
are limited in impact on violence within schools.  This finding is only slightly 
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counterintuitive, as the basic premise of institutional research is that organizations matter.  
Noting that the exosystem has limited effect means that some microsystem must have 
influence on organizational violence.  There are several obvious microsystems of interest 
in this question, however, this study deals with violence in organizations and the 
organizations of interest are schools.  The question then becomes, what effect do schools 
have on the violence within them?           
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CHAPTER III 
SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND THE ORGANIZATION 
 The proceeding chapter illuminates one important fact; violence in schools is not 
simply a reflection of the general community.  This leaves the important question of what 
does cause violence in schools.  The external environment, the exosystem, offers very 
limited explanatory power as to why schools experience levels of deviance.  This finding 
is expected as many theories in public policy and organization theory would assume the 
individual units shape events that occur within their purview.  For this reason it is 
important to evaluate how the microsystem, the organization, affects violence within its 
realm.  While the previous chapter controls for many of the stable parameters and 
external events that are expected to effect policy decisions and outcomes, this chapter  
deals with the constraints and resources of subsystem actors.  Specifically, this chapter 
investigates the relationship between attributes of the microsystem and violence.  The 
first logical step in this endeavor is to identify what, organizationally, is different about 
schools that creates an environment where mild deviant behavior is the norm, and 
extreme acts or deviant behavior seem more and more likely?        
Organizational Controls of Violence 
 In Merton’s (1957) opening to Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, he calls 
for a formal system of interaction within organizations that can “facilitate the interaction 
of the occupants of offices despite their (possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one 
another.”  Lasswell (1936) also describes how, within a bureaucracy, “Specific 
procedural devices foster objectivity and restrain the quick passage of impulse into 
action.”  Further evidence of the ability of an organization to control the actions of its 
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members through a formal bureaucratic structure is provided by Long (1949) and his 
concept of organizational culture.   
Organizational culture deals with the norms, rules, operating procedures, and 
hierarchical structure in place within an organization which causes the individual actors 
within the organization to behave in the same manner, and consequently to achieve 
similar results when asked to complete similar tasks.  In this respect, the values, beliefs, 
and norms brought to the organization by the individual are marginalized, because the 
organization itself has set up an informal set of actions which is deemed appropriate and 
has incorporated those ideas into its formal structure.  At this level, evidence of 
bureaucratic control over individual action is unquestionably achievable.  The question 
which then becomes particularly relevant is what motivates individuals within an 
organization to achieve organizational goals?     
Organizational Structure 
 The first factor in the control of organizational behavior is the level of 
organizational complexity present within the organization.  Organizational complexity 
deals with the number of layers of hierarchy present within an organization.  Complexity 
can occur both horizontally or vertically, but is almost always associated with the 
individual actor being insulated from the closest authority figure within that organization.  
There is no doubt that variation in organizational complexity can have an effect on 
individual behavior within an organization.  One study, for example, finds that crimes 
committed against companies by employees was directly related to organizational 
complexity (Vaughan, 1983).  The study concluded that as organizational complexity 
increased, the number of corporate crimes also increased.  Based upon this finding, one 
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can conclude that organizations tend to lose touch with individual behavior as they 
become more and more complex.  In relation to schools, this may mean that as schools 
grow larger students feel more alienated or removed from the authority structure of the 
school and are more likely to resort to forms of deviant behavior.  It is important to note 
that size itself is not complexity.  While larger will often translate to more complex, there 
are also mitigating factors that will not make this a perfectly linear relationship.  To begin 
with, size is managed by organization.  At the bottom of the school hierarchy, size is 
controlled by assigning students to classes and then controlling the size of the classes.  
Regulating the number of students to teachers means that the complexity of students can 
be managed by offering a reasonable span of control for students.  At each level of the 
bureaucratic structure of schools, this concept of span of control tempers the effects of 
the actual school size.  While there has been spirited debate about the effects of span of 
control in organizations (see Gulick 1937, Simon 1946), Meier and Bohte (2000) find 
negative correlation between size and span of control in school management in data on 
Texas school districts.  This indicates that as schools grow, the span of control is likely to 
increase slightly.  Therefore I expect that while spans of control will slow the increase in 
complexity created by size, it certainly will not nullify the effect.  Aditionally, 
maintaining reasonable spans of control will require either more units or more levels of 
hierarchy within the school district.  In this manner, school size will affect the complexity 
of the school district.  Organizational complexity may also take the form of segregation 
within the school.   
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Segregation in schools is accomplished through many mechanisms, however, the 
most prevalent are through utilizing tracking and “special needs” programs11.  Schools 
have used various instruments for grouping students for the better part of the last century 
(Tropea 1987).  Unfortunately, these many forms of segregation have devastating effects 
on students.  Students tracked into the remedial programs are often left unskilled and 
unprepared to compete in the workplace.  More immediately though, school segregation 
reinforces student peer groups.  That is students are isolated with limited contact to 
students not within the specified clustering imposed by the system.  This in turn can lead 
to several key indicators of deviant behavior including reinforcing antisocial peer groups, 
academic failure and increased risk of peer rejection (Verlinden, Hersen and Thomas 
2000).     
Organizational Control 
 Organization theory has long been littered with the concepts of command and 
control.  Earliest mentions of command and control are evidenced in the early works 
including Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan, but the notion becomes 
permanently imbedded in the literature through the work of Weber (1922) discussing the 
strengths of the hierarchal organization, Barnard (1938) and March and Simon (1958).  
Formally, command and control in organizations is most frequently conceptualized as 
principal-agent relationships.  That is there is a principal who requires action and an 
agent who is charged with the execution.  Principal-Agent theory has waned in favor 
since its heyday in the eighties and nineties12; however, the simple concepts of principals, 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion of the detrimental effects of segregation systems within schools, see Tropea 
1987, Meier, Stewart & England 1989. 
12 For description and application of Principal-Agent theory, see Wood and Waterman 1994; for historical 
discussion Moe 1984, Mitnick 1980. 
  37 
  
 
agents and slack resources are still a fitting heuristic for understanding relationships of 
power in organizations.   
 The second factor affecting organizational control of individual behavior is linked 
to the amount of command and control, or formalization, found within the organization.  
This is often defined as the formal rules, standard operating procedures, and guidelines of 
an organization (Goh & Richards 1997).  In studies of governmental bureaucracies, the 
higher the level of professionalization present within an organization, the more likely 
extreme formalization will produce conflict and alienation within said organization (Hall, 
1996).  While professionalization is of particular concern within schools as organizations, 
there may also be a link between this literature and school violence.  The reason that 
professionals react negatively to excessive formalization is that is greatly restricts their 
autonomy and freedom.  Likewise, as students in schools become older, and are seeking 
to “find themselves” socially, they are more likely to avoid the excessive formalization 
that is necessary to control behavior within large organizations.   
 The third factor deals with an organization’s ability to motivate individuals to 
achieve organizational goals.  Concerning this factor, it is important to look at Maslow’s 
(1943) Theory of Human Motivation.  While Maslow deals with a varied amount of 
factors which contribute to human motivation, once the lower order, physiological needs 
have been addressed, there are other needs, such as Esteem Needs and The Need for Self-
Actualization which become increasingly important as people mature.  Esteem Needs are 
based upon the belief that all people in our society have a “need or desire for a stable, 
firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and 
for the esteem of others” (Maslow, 1943).  Similarly, the Need for Self-Actualization 
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deals with the realization that “a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, 
unless the individual is doing what he is suited for” (Maslow, 1943).  These needs are 
closely associated to a human being’s need to have some significant decision-making 
authority in what they are doing in their lives.  The link between individual motivation 
and organizational goals is connected to the organization’s ability to instill a sense of 
self-esteem and self-actualization in the individual through the individual’s association 
with the organization.  The highly structured curriculum and extremely centralized 
decision-making authority which is present in schools causes a neglect of these basic 
needs, and thereby a further alienation of the individual.   
 The final factor which is essential for organizational control over individual 
behavior deals with the depersonalization of the individual.  In organizations it is key to 
control the social structure of the organization so that decisions are made with the 
organizational goal in mind, not the well-being of individuals within the organization.  In 
this instance, if conflict arises, it does so between offices or departments, along 
guidelines and procedures which have been organizationally defined, thereby reducing 
the friction in these situations which might cause institutional reactions or violence.  
While this factor is especially useful in large governmental organizations, it is not 
possible to institutionalize, or depersonalize, all conflict within a school setting.  More 
than in any other organization, schools deal with individuals, and more importantly 
individuals who are just beginning to gain a sense of themselves, and are not as confident 
in who they are as individuals.  This creates a unique situation within schools as 
organizations which can lead to a further increase in alienation, and therefore an increase 
in the probability of violent action. 
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 There are certainly institutional factors which can be employed by organizations 
to affect the behavior of individuals within those organizations, however, they may or 
may not have universal applicability across all organizations.  While I demonstrate in the 
beginning of this paper that schools are ideal types of large governmental bureaucracies 
which are especially relevant to the study of organizations, there are also some 
organizational peculiarities which set schools apart from other organizations.  The key 
components of this uniqueness are the age, maturity, and relative captivity of the 
individuals who make up the organization. 
Modeling Organizational Covariates of Violence 
 Theoretically, it is clear that violence in the organization should be a function of 
organizational structure and control plus the effect of exogenous events.  To examine the 
effect of organizational structure and control on violence, additional data are combined 
with the Texas Education Data used in the previous chapter.  The additional data are the 
result of two separate surveys conducted by the Texas Educational Excellence Project, a 
subsidiary of the Project for Equity, Representation and Governance at Texas A&M 
University.  The first survey measures correlates of crime and delinquency and the 
second deals with superintendent perceptions and control.     
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this study is the level of violence in the schools free of 
the effect of the outside community.  To construct this variable, I use the residuals from 
the regressions that predict violence in the previous chapter.  I do this for two specific 
reasons.  First, because the additional data used in this chapter are generated by survey, 
there are far fewer observations than in the base data which contains all school districts in 
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the state of Texas.  While I could simply reuse the same dependent variables and include 
the measures for community violence, this would mean estimating the covariance 
between community violence and school violence using far fewer observations.  
Sacrificing the additional observations would require a tacit acceptance of covariance 
predictions that are inferior to what is possible given the data.   
 Second, this approach offers a more parsimonious and more conservative estimate 
of the impact of organizational structure on violence.  This is more parsimonious because 
the resulting models will have fewer parameters.  The approach is more conservative 
because I allocate all variance in the dependent variable subject to collinearity between 
the two systems, to the exosystem.  I also save a few degrees of freedom in the reduced 
dataset by not having to estimate the parameters for the external environment.   
Independent Variables - Structure  
 The first set of independent variables I examine in this study deal with the nature 
of the structure of the organization.  These variables examine size, complexity, and 
systems that create divisions or unity within the student body.  There is some contention 
as to whether or not size matters in organizations.  Intuitively, size should affect many of 
the important aspects of an organization laid out by Gulick (1937).  In his seminal work 
on organizational theory, Gulick addresses the importance of division of labor, span of 
control, central control and homogeneity.  It would seem obvious that a larger 
organization would require more subdivisions both horizontally and vertically to maintain 
optimal span of control over the individuals within the organization.  This theory is 
consistent with many studies in organizational theory, however, scholars are not unified 
in the belief that increases in organizational size will always result in greater 
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organizational complexity (See Rainey 1997 for a discussion of this).   In the study of 
education, size has been demonstrated to be an important covariate for many 
organizational outputs.  To control for organizational size in this study I include the 
average annual enrollment for the school district.  Because the violence measure used as 
a dependent variable is created from violence rates within the school there should be no 
concern about spuriousness in any relationship.   
Organizational complexity is not a function of size alone.  Complexity is a 
function of specialty within an organization (Hall 1996).  Many studies simply use a 
count of sub-units for a measure of complexity; however, education is not quite as clear.  
For instance, complexity in education can come from specific needs that are diverse 
across classes and not broken into specific classes.  This problem is similar to the 
problem Perrow (1973) identifies when he discusses the dimensions of organizational 
technology.  For the purpose of this study, I expand the definition of complexity to 
include any confounding factors that affect the organizational outputs.  Specifically, I 
examine: Homogeneity, Sub-structuring, special needs, operational effectiveness, and 
organizational challenges. 
Homogeneity is a complex issue in schools.  Typically, homogeneity in 
organizations can be assessed in examining the array of outputs and the technical 
knowledge needed to complete the given outputs.  In education, the anticipated outputs 
for most schools are nearly identical; however, the technology necessary may be vastly 
different.  Many studies in education demonstrate that different populations need 
different technologies to succeed.  For instance, a large body of literature supports the 
notion that representation in education has a positive effect on minority populations (See 
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Meier et al. 2005).  Preliminary examination of these data show that no specific group 
(blacks, whites, or Hispanics) is responsible for creating more complexity than any other.  
Rather, it is the relative density of each of these groups that matter.  That is, a school with 
a homogeneous population has less diversity in needs than a more heterogeneous one.  To 
compensate for this type of organizational complexity, I include a herfindahl index to 
measure of diversity among students and a separate one among staff.  This index ranges 
from zero to one with zero being a perfectly heterogeneous population and one being a 
perfectly homogeneous population.  Additionally, I include measures of the percent of 
students from low-income homes and the percent of students in bilingual education. 
To measure the subunits within the school, I use measures of the percent of 
students in each specialty program.  As well as the percent in bilingual education 
mentioned above, I include measures for the percent of students in vocational education, 
gifted education and special education.  I measure each of these specialty programs as 
separate programs instead of measuring them using a diversity measure because they do 
not each represent similar programs.  That is, the organizational drain from one to the 
other is not equal, therefore, a diversity scale indicating that the school was entirely 
occupied by students in vocational education would not intuitively be the same as a an 
organizational scale measure indicating that the school is entirely occupied with special 
education programs. Additional organizational challenges addressed in this model include 
teacher turnover and student dropout. 
Employee turnover in organizations often has detrimental effects13.  Most 
important to the study of violence in organizations is the effect turnover has on policy 
implementation.  Every individual requires training and socialization to be fully 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the effects of turnover in general, see Kellough and Seldon 1997. 
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productive within an organization.  The more turnover an organization suffers, the less 
productive that organization will be.  Given this, I expect that organizations with higher 
turnover will have higher levels of violence.  I include a measure of the number of 
teachers who leave as a percent of the total number of teachers to control for this.  
Because these data are cross-sectional, it is impossible tell the direction of causality in 
this relationship.  That is, a positive coefficient may indicate either the turnover creating 
organizational inefficiency or that employees tend to leave organizations with more 
violence.  I assume this relationship is bi-directional; that both relationships exist.  For 
this reason, I include this measure more for control than to differentiate absolute 
causality.      
Dropout rates have been found to be strongly related to violence in schools14.  
Over and above the relationships between dropouts and violence, dropouts present 
specific challenges and represent a population that may require a alternative technologies 
for a school district.  Students who dropout are strongly associated with special needs 
populations (Zweig et al. 2002).  Dropout rates are correlated with minority, low income 
and bilingual populations.  To measure the effect of dropouts on the organization I 
include a measure of the number of students who dropout of school as a percentage of the 
total population.  This measure should not capture much more that the effect of the costs 
of student losses as many of the specific populations correlated with dropouts are 
included in the model. 
The final indicators testing the effects of organizational structure on violence rates 
deal with organizational effectiveness.  I hypothesize that organizations that are better at 
meeting goals will be better at reducing violence than those who are not as efficient at 
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meeting goals.  As a measure of organizational efficiency in meeting goals, I include a 
measure of the percent of the students who pass the TASS test in the 10th grade.  TASS is 
the basic skills test required for graduation given to all students and required by the state 
of Texas.  In addition, I include a measure of revenue per pupil to control for 
organizational inputs                 
Independent Variables – Control 
 The idea of organizational control is a function of two main structures, overhead 
control and formalization.  As mentioned previously, the first notion of control is that of 
overhead control.  That is control comes from oversight of students by teachers or staff.  
To estimate the effects of overhead control as a check on school violence I include a 
teacher student ratio for the district.  Control, however, is not always a function of 
overhead supervision15.  There are several alternatives to principal-agent control in 
organizations.  This includes socialization, institutional norms, and culture. 
 To evaluate the effect of socialization and culture on school violence, I include 
measures of the professionalism of the teachers.  This is because formally educated 
teachers are steeped in the norms and cultures of a professional teaching profession and 
should hold similar values and beliefs regarding treatment of violence in schools.  To 
measure professionalism, I include measures of average teacher salary, the percent of 
teachers with permits, the percent of teachers with advanced degrees and the percent of 
teachers with more than five years of experience.  Teacher salary provides a rough 
measure of the quality of teachers in a district.  The districts that provide higher salaries 
should, in theory, be able to attract the most qualified teachers.  Teachers with permits are 
teachers who do not have a degree in teaching, but are allowed to teach by a waiver of the 
                                                 
15 For a review of literature on informal control of bureaucracies, see Meier 1997 
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requirement by the state.  These individuals have not been initiated into the teaching 
profession through the same channels as most teachers and are not as likely to hold the 
same values as those socialized in a formal education process.  Teachers with advanced 
degrees measures those teachers with more formal training and in turn those more wed to 
the orthodoxy of teaching.  Teachers with high levels of experience are those who have 
been in the profession for a significant period of time and should be more adept in the 
job.  Also, these individuals are also those furthest from their exposure to the teaching 
orthodoxy taught in the education process. 
 Additionally, I examine the homogeneity and strength of the students’ beliefs.  I 
include a relative measure of student espirit de corps, and a relative measure of student 
clique groups within the district.  These were measured by asking superintendents, “on a 
scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being few and 5 being many, how many specific clique groups are 
evident within your district.” And asking, “on a scale of 1 to five with one being low and 
5 being high, how would you rate the student espirit de corps of the students in your 
district.”  I include these measures because diversity in student beliefs will directly 
impact policy implementation in schools.  The more homogeneous the student body, the 
more the student body will self-regulate, and in turn, the more easily policies can be 
implemented.  Descriptive Statistics for all variables can be found in Table 3.1 
Results 
 The dependent variable in this model are the residuals of a prior regression and 
therefore, require special attention when fit.  Because the actual variances of the 
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dependent variable are explicitly known, the data are fit using weighted least squares.16  
Results are listed in table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Indicators 
 
Variable N  Mean SD Min Max 
Size      
Enrollment 1063 3942.979 11718.370 19 210179
Diversity   
Homogeneity of Student Body 1063 0.643 0.179 0.263 1
Homogeneity of Teachers 1063 0.858 0.146 0.363 1
% Students who are from Low Income 
Homes 1063 47.430 19.474 0 100
% Students in Bilingual Education 1063 5.876 8.941 0 79
Subunits   
% Students in Vocational Education 1063 5.876 8.941 0 79
% Students in Gifted Education 1063 7.810 4.014 0 50
% students in Special Education 1063 14.640 4.499 0 49
Additional Challenges   
Teacher Turnover Rate 1063 16.259 7.782 0 55
District Dropout Rate 1041 1.056 1.118 0 10
% of all Students that Pass the TASS Test 1063 80.905 9.189 43 100
% of Low Income Students Passing TASS 1053 73.849 10.544 38 100
Revenue per Pupil 1063 6635.71 2275.83 2755 40147
Control   
Teacher to Student Ratio 1063 12.804 2.445 4 29
Formalization   
Average Teacher Salary 1062 32721.61 2423.10 24626 44922
% Teachers with one or more Permits 1063 3.940 4.669 0 43
Teachers with less than 5 years 
Experience 1063 31.938 11.094 0 83
% Teachers with Advanced Degrees 1063 20.096 10.229 0 77
Student Preference Homogeneity   
Espirit de Corps 464 3.596 1.009 0 5
Relative Number of Cliques 464 2.689 1.28 0 5
 
 
                                                 
16 There are three possible solutions for heteroskedasticity in this model.  The first is by using OLS with 
bootstrapped standard errors, the second is by using variance weighting conditional on a given right hand 
side variable, and the third is “whitewashing the model.  As the asymptotic properties of the White’s 
standard errors are not well known, I opted to employ the other two techniques.  While the coefficient 
estimates for each were similar, the bootstrapped standard errors resulted in far more variables meeting the 
threshold of significance.  I therefore opt for the more conservative results of the weighted least squares.  
Weighting is an inverse function of the school enrollment.   
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Overall, this model fits well, predicting 33 percent of the variation in the violence 
index.  This figure alone is very significant insomuch as this reinforces the tenets of 
Ecological systems theory, indicating that the microsystem does in fact influence a 
substantial portion of the behavior within its prevue.  More important to this work, this 
statistic indicates that not only do schools matter, but that they matter a great deal more 
than the external environment.  Recall, not only was the r squared for the environment in 
the last chapter significantly smaller than this, but also, this model is being predicted on 
the residuals of the prior regression.  This means that any collinear variance between the 
environment and the microsystem are being parceled to the environment.  
Because the weighting is a function of enrollment and because the dependent 
variable has been purged of the community effects, it is no surprise to have no coefficient 
for the school enrollment. 
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Table 3.2 
WLS Model of Violence Index 
 
Dependent Variable: Violence Index β se P Beta 
Size     
Enrollment 0.0000 0.0000 0.2130 0.0345
Diversity     
Homogeneity of Student Body 0.1594 0.3296 0.6290 0.0152
Homogeneity of Teachers -2.0875 0.4682 0.0000 -0.1426
% Students who are from Low Income Homes -0.0080 0.0039 0.0410 -0.0809
% Students in Bilingual Education -0.0309 0.0078 0.0000 -0.1256
Subunits     
% Students in Vocational Education 0.0046 0.0038 0.2240 0.0361
% Students in Gifted Education 0.0436 0.0112 0.0000 0.1067
% students in Special Education 0.0237 0.0096 0.0140 0.0740
Additional Challenges     
Teacher Turnover Rate 0.0021 0.0055 0.7020 0.0119
District Dropout Rate 0.2779 0.0372 0.0000 0.2153
% of all Students that Pass the TASS Test -0.0644 0.0128 0.0000 -0.3866
% of Low Income Students Passing TASS 0.0192 0.0098 0.0510 0.1350
Revenue per Pupil 0.0000 0.0000 0.2400 0.0431
Control     
Teacher to Student Ratio -0.1536 0.0311 0.0000 -0.2028
Formalization     
Average Teacher Salary -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2494
% Teachers with one or more Permits 0.0450 0.0082 0.0000 0.1485
Teachers with less than 5 years Experience -0.0351 0.0052 0.0000 -0.2836
% Teachers with Advanced Degrees -0.0249 0.0046 0.0000 -0.1530
Student Preference Homogeneity     
Espirit de Corps * * * * 
Relative Number of Cliques * * * * 
Constant 13.8087 1.4891 0.0000   
     
N 1023    
F 29.7    
Prob > F 0    
Adj R-squared 0.3358    
Root MSE 1.4579    
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Measures of the school diversity are split.  The measure for diversity in the 
student body shows no effect for differing populations within the school.  Recall, this 
measure simply relates to the student body being of the same race and ethnicity, not a 
specific race or ethnicity.  For example, of the highly homogeneous districts (those with a 
diversity measure greater than .8), 180 districts have a majority white students and 60 
have a majority Hispanic.  I expect that some of the variance this measure would pick up 
has been purged as a part of the community effects, however, it is very interesting to see 
that with all else constant, diversity has no perceived effect among the students.   
Teacher homogeneity has a negative coefficient.  This indicates that as the 
teachers become less diverse there is less violence in schools.  The finding here is 
questionable, as much of the literature on teacher diversity in schools indicates that 
teacher diversity should have a positive effect on the school environment.  Further 
investigation reveals that diversity is strongly correlated with the percent of teachers that 
are white (r = .71), and inversely correlated with the percent of students that are bilingual 
(r = -.44), the percent of students from low income homes (r = -.49), and enrollment (r = 
-.36).  It would seem then that this measure is not picking up the effects of diversity, 
rather providing evidence that better schools in higher income areas have more white 
teachers.  In fact, when an indicator of the percent of teachers that are white is included in 
the model, it takes on a negative coefficient of similar magnitude to that reported for 
teacher diversity.  Additionally, none of the other coefficients change significantly.  
Apparently there are reduced incidents of violence or the reporting there of in smaller 
white upper-class schools over and above what would be expected by environmental 
change alone.    
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Oddly, the model reveals a significant negative coefficient for the percent of 
students who are from low income homes.  Further investigation reveals that this 
indicator is strongly collinear with the percent of students who are in bilingual education 
(r = .55).  Additionally, if the low income indicator is removed from the model, the 
percent of bilingual students changes to a significant relationship with a standard beta of -
.17 (p<.000).  Additionally, dropping the low income indicator does not significantly 
change the other coefficients in the model and improves the Adjusted R-square statistic.  
Taken as a whole, these findings seem to indicate that serving the needs of special 
populations in the form of ESL classes significantly decreases the level of violence 
within the school.  This does not seem to be the case with special programs with a history 
of tracking students out of successful programs.  Table 3.2 clearly indicates that 
vocational education and special education programs, tracking programs identified by 
Meier, Stewart, and England (1989), lead to increases in violence within schools.  The 
important question here is Why bilingual programs and not vocational or special 
education? 
The answer to this question is simple.  In the current economy, special education 
and vocational education do not prepare our children for careers, while bilingual 
education allows students with a competitive disadvantage compete.  Special education 
and vocational education lead to segregation from the general school population. Jenkins 
(1995) examined 754 middle school students and found that decreasing school 
commitment leads to increasing rates of school crime.  Conversely, bilingual education 
connects otherwise segregated students with the rest of the student population. 
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Staff turnover results in increases in violence in schools.  This indicator relates to 
the ability of the organization to implement policy as well as to the quality of teaching, 
and according to this model quality instruction does matter.  The negative and remarkably 
strong standardized beta for the TASS pass rate indicates that where students achieve, 
violence diminishes.  Strangely, there is a positive, significant coefficient on the low 
income pass rate.  This coefficient is probably a correction to the dramatic effect of 
success in the presence of a confounding factor.  It would seem that success is not as 
powerful for students handicapped by a low income background. 
Control and professionalism all perform as expected.  The model reveals that 
more teacher per student reduce the violence rate; however, the effect is not nearly as 
dramatic as some of the other organizational factors.  It would seem that the lesson here 
is your can force compliance, but it is far better to inspire it!  Also, it seems that young 
professional teachers offer better control than those with more experience. 
The coefficient for teachers with permits is positive and significant.  This may be 
that non-trained teachers are not as prepared at handling students or that simply in a state 
with a scarcity of teachers; districts with violence problems have problems attracting 
qualified educators.  In reality I suspect the answer is somewhere in the middle.  In the 
same vein, we see that teachers with advanced degrees are associated with reduced levels 
of violence and districts that pay more for their teachers have a reduced (albeit slight) 
violence.    These three indicators are all related, but together have a good moral; better 
teachers lead to a better school environment. 
Finally, the examination of homogeneity in the school districts bore no fruit.  
Both the measures of school spirit and relative number of social groups were not related 
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to the levels of violence in the schools.  Because these measures were collected from a 
survey which had far fewer responses than the data for the other indicators (411 v. 1023) 
I dropped these indicators from the model.  Interestingly, all the other measures behave 
similarly in the reduced sample.  The reduced sample regression is displayed in table 3.3 
Conclusion 
 Clearly, this chapter demonstrates that organizational structure and control do 
covary strongly with violence.  As theory would suggest, Chapter II demonstrates a weak 
effect of environmental factors while this chapter plainly reveals the possibility of 
controlling violence though organizational means.  In addition to confirming the 
applicability of an individual level theory in group level analysis, these simple theoretic 
findings hold complex information for practitioners. 
This section highlights some very important facts about violence in schools.  The 
first major fact is that violence in schools is more a product of schools than the 
environment.  This finding is a double-edged sword for administrators.  Clearly, violence 
in schools can not be ignored as a function of the environment because schools do have 
the means to temper the effects of the environment within the school.  This means that 
administrators can and should try to implement means to combat violence.  It also means 
that administrators do not have an excuse for violence! 
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Table 3.3 
WLS Model of Violence Index (Reduced Sample) 
 
Dependent Variable: Violence Index β se P Beta 
Size     
Enrollment 0.0000 0.0001 0.8880 0.0054
Diversity     
Homogeneity of Student Body 0.5867 0.7443 0.4310 0.0402
Homogeneity of Teachers -5.7218 0.9100 0.0000 -0.2828
% Students who are from Low Income Homes -0.0201 0.0083 0.0160 -0.1480
% Students in Bilingual Education -0.0425 0.0138 0.0020 -0.1362
Subunits     
% Students in Vocational Education -0.0019 0.0077 0.8110 -0.0101
% Students in Gifted Education 0.1267 0.0247 0.0000 0.2043
% students in Special Education 0.0364 0.0182 0.0460 0.0900
Additional Challenges     
Teacher Turnover Rate -0.0095 0.0140 0.4990 -0.0334
District Dropout Rate 0.4985 0.0672 0.0000 0.3262
% of all Students that Pass the TASS Test -0.0421 0.0273 0.1230 -0.1866
% of Low Income Students Passing TASS 0.0052 0.0193 0.7870 0.0270
Revenue per Pupil 0.0000 0.0000 0.5980 -0.0297
Control     
Teacher to Student Ratio -0.2614 0.0588 0.0000 -0.2666
Formalization     
Average Teacher Salary -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.2306
% Teachers with one or more Permits 0.0764 0.0147 0.0000 0.2062
Teachers with less than 5 years Experience -0.0538 0.0097 0.0000 -0.2882
% Teachers with Advanced Degrees -0.0386 0.0081 0.0000 -0.1905
Student Preference Homogeneity     
Espirit de Corps 0.0683 0.0863 0.4290 0.0318
Relative Number of Cliques 0.0883 0.0828 0.2870 0.0410
Constant 19.5769 2.8113 0.0000   
     
N 411    
F 23.37    
Prob > F 0    
Adj R-squared 0.5219    
Root MSE 1.7108    
 
As for how to combat violence, there are some clear and common sense 
organizational level approaches.  First and foremost is student success.  This chapter 
concurs with a large body of literature which suggests that if you give the student a future 
you will improve the present.  Here we see that where students succeed, violence is 
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reduced.  Additionally, specific programs which help students succeed (i.e.- bilingual 
education) also help reduce the levels of violence.  Better teachers, and more programs 
geared to student success reduce violence, however segregation does not. 
 Education literature has been reporting the negative impact of tracking in schools 
for several decades.  Clear evidence exists which shows that special education and 
vocational education programs are not on par with their counterparts internationally and 
do not prepare students for a career after school.  This lack of preparation leads many 
children to despair, alternative illicit career paths and disciplinary problems.  Here we see 
that these programs hurt not only the individual student, but the student body as a whole. 
 Considering these findings, the next important question is to focus on policies that 
deal with violence.  Specifically, we need to address resources directed at reducing 
violence in the schools as a matter of efficiency, because we clearly see that student 
success is a strong medicine for violence.  The major question then becomes should we 
focus anti-violence policies on violence or student success?     
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 CHAPTER IV 
THE POLICY PROCESS OF VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS  
 
Before evaluating policy dealing with violence in schools, it is important to first 
understand the processes that drive the generation and application of policy in schools.  
This section begins by describing the policy environment, players and constraints within 
the educational arena.  I then review major theories of public policy to generate a cogent 
theoretical frame to guide the analysis in the following chapter.  
Sources of Policy in Education 
Schools occupy a unique niche in government.  On the micro-level, individual 
schools are accountable to school boards.  In most states, non-partisan boards direct the 
operations of schools via a superintendent for these independent political entities.  On the 
macro-level, the environment of school policy is far more complex. National, state and 
local governments all have some role in school policy.  This means that any national 
change in school policy will have to be reviewed and implemented by the federal 
government, the governments of all fifty states, and the governing bodies of the more 
than 16,525 local school boards (DoED 2002).  Obviously, this high degree of 
complexity in the educational policy system will lead to a great deal of ambiguity in the 
implementation of policy on the school level, and ambiguity will tend to make the policy 
subsystem unstable.  How unstable is the policy environment of organizational violence 
in Schools?  To answer this question we must first understand the environment of school 
policy.   
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Federal Government in Education 
Most are familiar with federal interventions in the educational system.  Federal 
control of school policy is normally centered in the Department of Education (DoED).  
During its one hundred thirty-five year history,17 the Department of Education has seen 
roughly seventy public laws passed directly effecting elementary and secondary 
education in the United States (DoED 2002).  While this seems like a sizable number, the 
majority of these laws deal with specific policy areas of national interest.18  Similarly, the 
                                                 
17 Congress founded the U.S. Office of Education in 1867.  In 1979, The Department of Education was 
established as a cabinet-level department.  Technically, the Dept. of Education is only twenty-three years 
old, however, the institutional memory should date back to the founding office. 
18 These areas include people with disabilities [Education of Mentally Retarded Children Act (Public Law 
85-926), Captioned Films for the Deaf Act (Public Law 85-905), National Technical Institute for the Deaf 
Act (Public Law 89-36), Model Secondary School for the Deaf Act (Public Law 89-694), Elementary and 
Secondary Education Amendments of 1968 (Public Law 90-247), Handicapped Children's Early Education 
Assistance Act (Public Law 90-538), Education for All Handicapped Children Act (Public Law 94-142), 
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983 (Public Law 98-199), Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-372), Children with Disabilities Temporary Care Reauthorization 
Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-127), Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336), 
Improving America's Schools Act (Public Law 103-382), Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act Amendments of 1996 (Public Law 104-1834), Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Amendments of 1997 (Public Law 105-17), Assistive Technology Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-394)], low 
income issues [Amendment to Lanham Act of 1940 (Public Law 815 and Public Law 874, 81st Congress, 
in 1950), School Lunch Indemnity Plan (Public Law 78-129), National School Lunch Act (Public Law 79-
396), Financial Assistance for Local Educational Agencies Affected by Federal Activities (Public Law 81-
815 and Public Law 81-874), (Public Law 815), (Public Law 874), School Milk Program Act (Public Law 
83-597), Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (Public Law 87-510), Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-10), School Assistance in Disaster Areas Act (Public Law 89-313), 
Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1968 (Public Law 90-247), Indochina Migration and 
Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-23), Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary 
and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988 (Public Law 100-297), Stewart B. McKinney 
Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-628), Childhood Education and 
Development Act of 1989 (Part of Public Law 101-239), Improving America's Schools Act (Public Law 
103-382), Human Rights, Refugee, and Other Foreign Relations Provisions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
319)], vocational education [Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, Smith-
Bankhead Act of 1920 George-Barden Act (Public Law 80-402), National Defense Education Act (Public 
Law 85-864), Vocational Education Act of 1963 (Part of Public Law 88-210), Economic Opportunity Act 
of 1964 (Public Law 88-452), Vocational Education Amendments of 1968 (Public Law 90-576), Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-93), Carl D. Perkins Vocational 
Education Act (Public Law 98-524), National Service Trust Act (Public Law 103-82), School-To-Work 
Opportunities Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-239), Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Technology 
Education Amendments of 1998 (Public Law 105-332)], and safety [Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 
88-352), Drug Abuse Education Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-527), Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act 
of 1972 (Public Law 92-255), Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-
415), Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1986 (Part of Public Law 99-570), Student Right-To-
Know and Campus Security Act (Public Law 101-542), School Dropout Prevention and Basic Skills 
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Federal courts have only been involved in education in areas of national interest such as 
the separation of church and state, desegregation and bilingual education.  This is not to 
say that the federal role in elementary and secondary is trivial.  In 2000, more than ten 
federal departments contributed funds to schools.  Of those agencies, the Department of 
Education alone spent over 16 billion dollars on elementary and secondary education at 
the local level (DoED 2002).  Additionally, the Department of Education also sponsors a 
variety of state level educational organizations.  For example, the Department of 
Education sponsors fourteen agencies that deal with education in Texas in addition to 
support for the primary educational system.  This illustrates that not only are their 
multiple federal agencies influencing state education, but also multiple paths for 
individual federal agencies to influence education.  While this system of multiple links 
between the federal and state systems create opportunities for federal influence, the 
United States educational system should not be mistaken for one with strong central 
control.  Unlike most other developed nations, the national government of the United 
States does not operate a national school system (Cochran & Malone 1995).  Instead, the 
majority of the responsibility for elementary and secondary education in the US is located 
on the state and local level.  (Dye 1988; Tyack & Cuban 1995). 
State and Local Control of Schools 
Every state has a department of education.  Typically, these state level agencies 
are regulatory and distributive in nature.  They provide funds, and above that they enforce 
state and federal level legislation dealing with education.  This includes tracking, testing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-600), Safe Schools Act of 1994 (Part of Public Law 103-227), 
Educational Research, Development, Dissemination, and Improvement Act of 1994 (Part of Public Law 
103-227), Improving America's Schools Act (Public Law 103-382)].  Other issue areas include Native 
American issues, Focus programs for math, sciences and the arts, and budget issues (DoED 2000).  
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and certification.  Additionally, states generate guidelines for curriculum, rules for charter 
schools, home schooling, and equivalency testing.  In education policy, the state role is 
greater than that of the Federal government, but not the chief arena for policy generation 
or implementation.  Real policy occurs mainly at the local level. 
Hess (1999) Identifies several actors in the policy making process in large urban 
school districts.  Chief among these actors are the school board and the superintendent.  
Following in order of importance, come teachers unions, civic/business leaders, 
community/PTA/parents, local politicians, administrators, the courts and finally the state 
(61).  It is clear that Education policy as a domain has multiple streams of policy 
initiation, and that among the many streams of policy, the local are the most influential.     
Policy Theories and School Violence 
Evaluating policy typically entails quantifying outputs or outcomes and relating 
them to the policy inputs contributed by the system; however, to understand the policy 
system we have to have insight as to how the relations between the system inputs operate 
on the system outputs and outcomes.  It follows then, that the quality of the information 
derived from any analysis is directly linked to the completeness of the theory guiding the 
investigation.   
Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993, 1998) argue that policy subsystems are a 
dynamic process that is best represented as a punctuated equilibrium (PE).  That is there 
is some constant incremental change process that normally occurs that may be punctuated 
from time to time by an external event.  The authors describe this system as one that is a 
rational incremental process, much like that described by Lindblom (1959) and 
Wildavsky (1964), except from time to time new mobilizations can cause the rational 
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system to explode.  This simple approach provides an eloquent picture of the policy 
process over time and seems to describe well the phenomenon of violence in schools.  
There has always been some level of violence, but the events at Columbine marked a 
“punctuation” in the process and have led to rapid change within a short timeframe.  
Unfortunately, the Punctuated Equilibrium theory offers little insight into what occurs 
within the organization, and therefore merely describes the phenomenon as opposed to 
offering insight at the organizational level. 
A similar theory to PE is the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF), proposed 
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993).  The authors offer a comprehensive system of 
policy analysis that evaluates policy as a subsystem, expanding on the traditional idea of 
a subsystem offered by Easton (1965).  The ACF is a powerful theoretic tool for the 
analysis of policy, which expects that over time the policy process will be a stable 
environment with routine change being a function of the intersection of beliefs among 
coalitions competing for control.  There are two major differences between the ACF and 
PE theories of the policy process.  These are focus and relevance of the actors involved. 
Punctuated Equilibrium deals primarily with information surrounding the 
punctuation.  PE is based in budget theory and contributes mostly by helping identify 
when a punctuation is or will occur and not what is going on within the policy subsystem 
during the punctuation.  This lack of information is due primarily to the lack of focus on 
the periods of stability.  Conversely, the ACF provides little insight to the periods of 
punctuation as the theory deals with the interactions of coalitions during periods of 
stability.  Punctuations are treated as external to the system and their effects are not 
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considered important to the long term evaluation.  This divergence accounts for the 
difference in the treatment of the actors in the system. 
PE treats actors as incremental decision makers, guided in action by bounded 
rationality.19  This system relegates routine change to a simple power struggle.  On the 
other hand, the ACF focuses on routine change and attributes change during periods of 
stability to interactions in the belief systems of the dominant coalitions in the policy 
subsystem.   According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, policy outcomes are a function of 
external system events, resources, and subsystem actors.  External system events are 
responsible for punctuations, while the interaction of beliefs govern the periods of 
stability.  Unfortunately, punctuations are inherently more interesting than periods of 
stability.  Therefore, to gain insight to the policy process during times of punctuation, the 
ACF must be extended to leverage these periods.   
The ACF in Practice 
The ACF holds that change is the function of two causal factors, interaction of 
coalition beliefs and exogenous shocks, where the interaction of beliefs generate 
incremental change and exogenous shocks produce radical change.  The strength of this 
approach is that it offers insight to the interactions of the individuals over a three-tiered 
belief system.   The ACF holds that coalitions are comprised of relevant actors, be they 
governmental, interest group, or private individuals.  These individuals are bound  
                                                 
19 See Simon (1957, 1977, 1983, 1985) 
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together by policy-oriented beliefs.  Most fundamental of all beliefs are the Deep Core 
beliefs, followed by Policy Core beliefs, then Secondary Aspect beliefs.  Table 4.1 re-
creates the original description of belief systems provided by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993).  Interactions between coalitions during times of relative stability deal mainly with 
policy learning in reference to coalition beliefs.  These interactions are governed by a set 
of hypotheses which due to the overwhelming amount of research to date, I treat as 
axioms.  These are listed in table 4.2. 
Assuming assumption in hypothesis 5 dealing with significant perturbations 
external to the system is correct, we would expect that during times of relative 
environmental stability, the variance in policy outputs and outcomes should be low; 
however, this would logically assume that during times of environmental instability, 
punctuations, we should see a large amount of variance in the policy outputs. 
Additionally, punctuations lead to additional problems to the conventional ACF 
approach.   
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Table 4.1 
ACF Belief System 
 
 Deep Core Beliefs Policy Core Beliefs Secondary Aspect 
Defining 
Characteristics 
Fundamental normative 
and ontological axioms 
Fundamental policy 
positions concerning the 
basic strategies for 
achieving normative 
axioms of deep core 
Instrumental decisions and 
information searches necessary to 
implement policy core 
Scope Part of basic personal 
philosophy.  Applies to all 
policy areas 
Applies to policy area of 
interest (and perhaps a few 
more) 
Specific to policy area/subsystem 
of interest 
Susceptibility 
to change 
Very difficult; akin to a 
religions conversion 
Difficult, but can occur if 
experience reveals serious 
anomalies 
Moderately easy; this is the topic 
of most administrative and even 
legislative policy policymaking 
Illustrative 
components 
1. The Nature of Man: 
   i. Inherently evil vs. 
socially redeemable 
   ii. Part of nature vs. 
dominion over nature 
   iii. Narrow egotists vs. 
contractarians 
 
2. relative priority of 
various ultimate values: 
freedom, security, power, 
knowledge, health, love, 
beauty, etc 
 
3. Basic criteria of 
distributive justice: Whose 
welfare counts?  Relative 
weights of self, primary 
groups, all people, future 
generations, nonhuman 
beings, etc. 
 
1. Proper scope of 
governmental vs. market 
activity 
 
2. Proper distribution of 
authority among various 
units of government 
 
3. Identification of social 
groups whose welfare is 
most critical 
 
4. Orientation on 
substantive policy 
conflicts, e.g., 
environmental protection 
vs. economic development 
 
5. Magnitude of perceived 
threat to those values 
 
6. Basic choices 
concerning policy 
instruments, e.g., coercion 
vs. inducements vs. 
persuasion 
 
7. Desirability of 
participation by various 
segments of society: 
   i. Public vs. elite 
participation 
   ii. Experts vs. elected 
officials 
 
8. Ability of society to 
solve problems in this 
policy area 
   i. Zero sum competition 
vs. potential for mutual 
accommodation 
   ii. Technological 
optimism vs. pessimism  
1. Most decisions concerning 
administrative rules, budgetary 
allocations, disposition of cases, 
statutory interpretation, and even 
statutory revision 
 
2. Information concerning 
program performance, the 
seriousness of the problems, etc. 
Reproduced from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) 
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Table 4.2 
ACF Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses Concerning Coalitions 
 
Hypothesis 1: On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the 
lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Actors within and advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to 
the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects. 
 
Hypothesis 3: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his or her belief system before 
acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 
 
Hypotheses Concerning Policy Change 
 
Hypothesis 4: The policy core attributes of a governmental program in a specific jurisdiction will not be 
significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in 
power within that jurisdiction—except when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior 
jurisdiction. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The policy core attributes of a governmental action program are unlikely to be changed in 
the absence of significant perturbations external to the system, i.e., changes in socio-economic conditions, 
public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other systems 
 
Hypotheses Concerning Learning across Coalitions 
 
Hypothesis 6: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an intermediate 
level of informed conflict between the two coalitions.  This requires that 
 a) Each have the technical resources to engage in such a debate. 
b) The conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other 
or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to 
policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those in which data and theory are generally 
qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policy-oriented learning across 
belief systems than those involving purely social or political systems because, in the former, many of the 
critical variables are not themselves active strategists and because experimentation is more feasible. 
 
Hypothesis 9 Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a forum that is 
a) Prestigious enough to force professionals form different coalitions to participate and 
 b) Dominated by professional norms 
Reproduced from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) 
Many times existing data are not sufficient to address external shocks.  This is the case 
with school violence where there were no states collecting these data before the need 
arose.  Even now that data do exist, they are not uniform across states and even districts 
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in come cases.  Recall also, that the system of interest here is a social system, a type of 
system Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) already caution is less likely to afford 
coalitional learning.   Simply, in periods of external shock, we should expect little 
coalitional learning within a policy subsystem.  It follows then, that during periods of 
stability as exemplified in hypotheses 4 and 5 change in system outputs will be governed 
by cross-coalitional learning; however, in times of exogenous shock change will be a 
function of the hypotheses governing coalitions themselves. 
Given the evidence supporting the notion of cross-coalitional learning driving 
change in times of stability (see Sabatier 2004), the remaining question becomes what 
happens when change is a function of something other than cross-coalitional learning. 
Cross-coalitional learning takes place when coalitions achieve consensus across core 
beliefs and are able to offer information effecting secondary aspects of the opposing 
belief systems.  When core beliefs are not reasonably uniform within coalitions, change 
will be a function of stabilizing core beliefs within the coalitions in effort to resolve 
perplexity in the linkages between beliefs and policies.  Perplexity in how policies relate 
to beliefs is a major source of uncertainty in systems dealing with exogenous shock; 
however, this is not the only source of uncertainty in the educational setting. 
Uncertainty in the Subsystem 
Superintendents are the primary source of policy in schools (Hess 1999).  Couple 
this fact with the fact that the average tenure of a superintendent is about five years, and 
we see that continuity is difficult to maintain in schools (Tyack & Cuban 1996).  Not 
only does the high turnover in superintendents create problems alone, but also 
superintendents are usually hired for the sole purpose of change (Hess 1999).  This means 
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that by design, there is little continuity in school policy.  When we talk about violence in 
schools, are we really dealing with an exogenous shock to an otherwise stable system, or 
are we actually dealing with an exogenous shock to an already unstable system?  
Typically, the ACF sees change as an incremental process bounded by the limitations 
imposed by the core beliefs of the participating coalitions.  Additionally, it suggests that 
exogenous shocks remove these systemic barriers to dynamic change, but does not offer 
guidance for these times.  Fortunately, several competing theories may be of assistance in 
understanding the subsystem changes during such times.  Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1972) describe a system likening the policy system to a garbage can.  Kingdon (1994) 
refined this theory into what is commonly referred to as Multiple-Streams theory.   
Kingdon states that policy change is a function of “policy streams” that meet 
during a window of opportunity.  He posits that all policy makers are limited by bounded 
rationality.  There is no perfect information, and decision makers are always required to 
make choices in some degree of uncertainty.  Kingdon posits that policy decisions are the 
result of streams of policies, problems and politics meeting in an arena of uncertainty.  In 
short, he suggests that policy is the result of a chaotic environment where policies are 
matched to problems in an environment riddled with ambiguity created by fluid 
participation, problematic preferences, and unclear technology (Zhariadis 1999).  What 
Kingdon terms ambiguity relates well to what Lindblom (1979) refers to as 
“understanding.”   
Lindblom proposes a two-fold theory of decision-making that divides types based 
on the level of understanding of the decision makers.  He posits where understanding is 
high, we see rational-comprehensive decision-making.  Where understanding is low, 
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decision makers default to disjointed decision-making (Hayes 1992).  This is where 
decision-making shifts from an incremental shift from the status-quo to a system 
characterized by: 1) limiting options to only familiar policies, 2) the intertwining of 
policy goals and values with empirical assessment, 3) greater preoccupation with the ills 
to be prevented rather than the positives to be gained, 4) a sequence of trials, errors, and 
retrials, 5) limited analysis and, 6) fragmentation of analysis to partisan participants to 
ensure all parties get a piece of the pie Weiss and Woodhouse 1992).  This difference in 
the decision-making system is important because it identifies what should theoretically 
happen in the case of uncertainty and therefore should lend insight to the change in the 
policy subsystem in the event of exogenous shock.  As in most typologies, Lindblom 
limits what is in reality a continuum to a dichotomous categorization.  I conceive this 
concept as a range and term levels of understanding as uncertainty.   
Typically, the Advocacy Coalitions Framework, Multiple Streams, and 
Punctuated Equilibrium are understood as radically different systems, however, they do 
complement each other well.  The following section describes the policy system as an 
ACF system that has a decision-making component that varies within a range bounded by 
a multiple streams/disjointed Incrementalism framework and a punctuated 
equilibrium/rational-comprehensive framework. 
Adapting ACF for High Levels of Systemic Uncertainty 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) offer a comprehensive system of policy 
analysis that evaluates policy as a subsystem, expanding on the traditional idea of a 
subsystem offered by Easton (1965).  ACF does not “fit” the evaluation of violence in 
schools, as the process has not had time to settle into a stable system.   
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Figure 4.1 
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Traditionally, the violence policy system in schools would be characterized by other 
theories; however, neither Multiple Streams Theory nor Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
seems to fit exactly.  The best representation lies somewhere in between the two.  
Multiple Streams and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory are not two choices from a bimodal 
pool, rather opposing views representing the ends of a continuum in respect to ambiguity 
in the decision making phase of the policy process.  Using this conceptualization of the 
policy process, we can refine the ACF to more closely represent the policy system 
evident in school violence.    
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the modified ACF Subsystem to reflect the role of 
uncertainty in the structure.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) state that a policy sub-
system is the arrangement of like coalitions within a given interest area.  They indicate 
that policy is generated by coalitions of actors in response to stable system parameters 
and external events, and that policy produces outputs and impacts that feed back into the 
sub-system.  Additionally, they assert that constraints and resources of the subsystem 
actors moderate this system.  Unfortunately, when there is a high degree of uncertainty, it 
becomes difficult for coalitions to match their core beliefs to policy responses.  Without 
the strong bonds between beliefs and polices, the tempering effect of coalition attachment 
to beliefs dissipates from the system and the process becomes erratic.  Given this, the 
correct specification for this theory is not to model the decision-making system like 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, but to allow this structure to vary in accordance to the 
amount of uncertainty in the system.  In systems with low amounts of uncertainty, the 
decision making process will look more like the reasoned and systematic rational-
comprehensive model of punctuated equilibrium theory.  In the event of high uncertainty, 
the reasoned system becomes irrational, more of a reactionary system.  The higher the 
level of uncertainty, the more the decision making process mimics the visceral disjointed-
incrementalism of a multiple streams system.  Systemic rationality dissipates, and policy 
choices tend to be quick-fixes for immediate problems.    
Additional Sources of Inherent Uncertainty 
As noted earlier, several structural components of the subsystem can create 
uncertainty.  These include short tenure of key policy makers, multiple interest groups, 
and the professionalism of the actors.   
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Figure 4.2 
The Role of Uncertainty in the Decision Making Process 
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There are several policy specific factors that also add to the relative amount of 
uncertainty in a policy subsystem, and they are all linked to a specific type of policy area; 
that is morality politics.  Typically, the application of ACF to policy domains does not 
necessitate consideration of policy typologies in the most traditional sense.  That is, 
studies using ACF do not need to spend time discussing the impacts of distributive or 
regulatory policy, as the traditional typologies do not identify aspects of policy that are 
relevant to the Advocacy Coalitions Framework.  One subdivision of policy studies that 
does, however, is morality policy. 
  70 
  
 
 Mooney (2000) characterizes morality policy as, “first and foremost, by debate 
over first principles (3).”  He states, 
A policy is classified as a morality policy based on the perceptions of the 
actors involved and the terms of debate among them… it is these 
perceptions of issues that we should be concerned with when defining this 
policy category.  If at least one advocacy coalition involved in the debate 
defines the issue as threatening one of its core values, its first principles, 
we have morality policy (4). 
 
 Issue areas that fall into the arena of morality policy include: Drugs (Meier 1994; 2001), 
Physician-assisted suicide (Glick & Hutchinson 2000), Censorship (Brisbin 2000), sexual 
preference (Haider-Markel 2000), Abortion (Goggin & Mooney 2000; Meier & 
McFarlane 2001), pornography (Smith 2001), but are not limited to what is listed here.20  
What is most important about morality politics is the effect it has on a policy subsystem.    
 Meier (1994) indicates that morality politics will have three important effects on 
the policy subsystem-- high salience, low cost of participation for citizens, and a high 
cost of opposition.  Gormley (1986; See also Meier 2000; Eisner et al. 1999) indicates 
that high salience issues normally draw the attention of principals.  High salience in 
regulatory policy makes enforcement easier and attracts multiple types of groups to the 
issue.  Additionally, given that “policy makers are more responsive to citizen values on 
morality policy than on non-morality policy (Mooney 2000, 9; See also Mooney & Lee 
1995, 2000; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Fairbanks 1977),” greater numbers of 
interest groups will fetter the policy system.  High salience alone is not enough to draw 
large numbers of participants to an issue subsystem.  For average citizens to participate, 
they must be able to enter the arena as a player and not merely an interested spectator.  
Gormley (1986) differentiates regulatory policy by salience and issue complexity.  
                                                 
20 For a review of morality policy literature, see Studlar 2000, Meier 2000, and Mooney 2000.   
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Morality policy is an issue area where the substance of policy discussion is always 
focused on values, morays, or belief systems.  This means that the complexity of the issue 
discussion is simple enough to not exclude the vast majority of the populace.  This is not 
to say that the issue itself is not complex.  For example, abortion is a highly salient issue 
nationally.  The debate over abortion is framed as either a pro-life or a pro-choice issue as 
opposed to a scientific discussion as to the origins of life, health effects of abortion, 
differing fetal status during gestation cycle, national economic impact, or even policy 
failure of sex education (Norrander & Wilcox 2000; Daynes & Tatalovich 1998).  By 
framing the issue as one over basic beliefs as opposed to scientific technicalities, the 
policy discussion becomes simple and requires less technical information for participants. 
 Finally, Meier (1994) indicates that the cost of opposition to morality policy will 
be high.  More specifically, the cost for opposing a moral position with anything other 
than a moral position will be high.  Morality policy is policy where, unlike traditional 
policy, there is little variance in positions across an issue area.  Typically, actors in the 
morality policy arena have very similar views.  In the case of abortion policy, most 
interested individuals are either in support of abortion or in opposition to it based on the 
individuals’ first principles.  In the case of abortion, there is a bimodal distribution of 
preferences with very little variance around each mode.  Areas of morality politics can be 
unipolar, bipolar, or possibly even multipolar.  Violence in schools is a policy domain 
where there is only one dominant moral stance.  Very few groups or individuals have 
stood up for the moral correctness of murder in organizations, especially in schools.  
Drunk driving is similar in the respect that is a unipolar morality issue.  
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  School violence is certainly a new issue area, despite the prevalence throughout 
history.  Additionally, much of the debate surrounding violence in schools has been 
visceral in nature as opposed to technical discussions.  Clearly, violence in schools fits 
Meier’s definition of morality policy, and given this fact, we should expect the following: 
• Coalition actors will tend to be less professional than participants in less salient 
topic areas (e.g. – the environment, national security). 
• Coalitions will all be anchored on a single pole of the debate.  That is no groups 
will take the pro-violence stance. 
o Subsequently, Coalitions will find it more difficult to differentiate 
themselves from competing coalitions on the core belief level. 
• Because the participants will be non-professionals operating in a subjective issue 
area, the opposite of the ACF expectations in hypotheses 6 through 9, we should 
expect that the policy domain of violence in schools will be a complex arena rife 
with uncertainty.     
As I have alluded to repeatedly, this uncertainty will effect the decision making process 
insomuch as it will temper policy efficacy, applicability, and the relative linkages 
between policy core beliefs and policy adoption. 
Implications for This Study 
 This chapter has characterized the policy environment of school violence.  I 
expect all coalitional groups to hold similar preferences based on the nature of the policy 
area.  Additionally, I expect that in spite of the homogeneous preferences for outcomes, 
the systemic ambiguity will produce an eclectic preference for policies.  Additionally, I 
expect that policy preference addressing school violence will not be a function of actual 
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levels of violence within the schools, but contextual based on the policy demands of the 
influence of the various coalitions in the subsystem.  In all, I expect that when evaluated 
coalitions are evaluated at the aggregate level, what will be present will more resemble 
Eaton’s original subsystems, where the major difference between each district’s system is 
not a function of systemic individuality, merely ambiguity in the system. 
 While I this may seem orthogonal to many contemporary approaches to policy 
analysis, I contend that the majority of advances over the past decade have been at the 
margins.  Contemporary policy theory is driven by a focus on new innovation as opposed 
to uniting theory into a parsimonious overarching theory.  All the while a few scholars 
have continued to focus on what was right.  That is we had it right with subsystems and 
many new theoretic innovations merely polish what we already have.  For instance, 
McCool (1998) suggests that there is little difference between the mutations of systems 
theory and offers a uniting framework for regulatory policy.  In a complex investigation 
of policy, Worsham (2004) finds subsystems alive and well in government.   
 I contend that the progress from subsystems theory to current network analysis is 
not innovation in policy theory, but merely refinement of theory driven by time and 
exponentially greater computational technology.  We should view a policy system not as 
a specific case of these systems, but as a point on a continuum of these systems located 
by the openness to the environment and systemic ambiguity.  In chapter V, I illustrate this 
point using violence in schools as a specific case.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE POLICY SUBSYSTEM: PLAYERS, POLICIES AND OUTCOMES 
 
While chapters II and III focused on the role of the organization in school 
violence, they leave out a very interesting and important part of the puzzle.  That is how 
can violence be changed and what are the costs of those changes.  Contemporary policy 
theory does not offer much directly pertinent to violence in schools, but as the last 
chapter demonstrates, there are some combinations of current theory that may lend 
insight.  This chapter deals specifically with how the policy subsystem affects violence in 
schools and it also addresses the negative externalities of those policies.     
In the preceding chapter, I make several assumptions about the policy system.  
Recall that while the ACF is a fruitful framework for addressing subsystem dynamics of a 
policy area, currently it is not well suited for addressing violence in schools.  Foremost is 
the problem of school violence being a relatively new subject.  While I argue that this has 
been a persistent problem, its salience did not reach national prominence until the events 
in Columbine Colorado in the mid 90’s.  While this does represent an available time 
frame of more than ten years, there are not data available for the majority of this period.  
Hence, the issue area is a difficult fit for the ACF as it is currently applied.  Secondarily, 
the ACF is not an aggregate theory.  That is to say, while the assumptions of the ACF are 
thought to be generalizable across policy subsystems, the theory has rarely been tested in 
aggregate level data.      
Assessing the Subsystem 
One of the major barriers to evaluating the ACF in aggregate level data is that the 
ACF deals with individuals as coalition members.  Because Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
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(1993) expect coalitions to be groups of individuals bound by similar preferences, 
comparison across subsystems becomes highly problematic due to an inability to exactly 
match coalitions across subsystems (e.g. Zafonte and Sabatier 2003).  While the detail 
provided by assessing individuals within the system is a necessity to understand the 
learning dynamics within the subsystem, this limits the scope to which this theory can be 
tested.  To alleviate this problem, I link individuals to representative interest groups 
within the subsystem.  On face, this may seem an inappropriate operationalization for 
coalition members under the ACF; however, I believe there is merit to this approach.  
First, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith expect that coalition membership is based upon 
common core beliefs.  While many large, fragmented interest groups may have a 
disjunction between organizational goals and member beliefs, this problem is not as 
severe in smaller interest groups.  Additionally, many of the interest groups identified 
here draw membership based on core beliefs at the local level.  
For instance, The National Rifle Association has been repeatedly criticized by its 
membership for espousing values not concurrent with the membership.  Most notably 
among these criticisms was the cancellation of lifetime membership by the 41st president 
of the United States.  Conversely, smaller, less fragmented interest groups often have 
more consistent values with the membership (Dean 1983). 
A second reason why interest groups are more reasonable identifier in the case of 
school violence is due to the nature of the policy area.  As I indicate in Chapter II, school 
violence is an issue of morality.  And as Meier (1994) points out, “morality policy is 
made to order for citizen participation in the policy process (p.7).”  This is because issues 
of morality policy are presented in a simple manner and are highly salient.  In these cases, 
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the policy beliefs of the member are more likely to be consistent with those of the interest 
group.  Additionally, Wood and Waterman (1994) indicate that in policy areas of high 
salience, public opinion has a far greater impact on policy implementation. 
Assuming that because the issue of school violence is a local issue with national 
prominence and because policy is most often adopted and implemented on the local level, 
the first step in assessing the policy subsystem of school violence is to identify how this 
problem reaches the agenda and how policy is formulated. 
Agenda Setting and Formulation  
There are many different incarnations of subsystems theory in public policy.  
Consistent among these are the basic ideas of four stages of the policy process.  While it 
is generally accepted that these stages are distinct only by artificial construct, I will use 
these stages to help conceptualize the process.  Generally, the policy process can be 
broken down into the agenda setting, formulation, implementation, and evaluation stages 
(Skok 1995).  In Chapter IV, I argue that the agenda setting and formulation phases vary 
from a rational process to a random process depending on the level of uncertainty in the 
system.  In an environment of low uncertainty, I expect that we would have a stable, 
rational system where the dominant coalition would dominate the agenda setting and 
formulation processes.  In the presence of high ambiguity created by external shock, I 
expect we should see no dominant coalitions in this process.  While in chapter IV, I 
suggest that this is similar to the Kingdon (1984) model, I must clarify a few points. 
First, Kingdon would expect no relation between the agenda setting and policy 
formulation.  This is because multiple streams theory expects the problem and policy 
streams to be independent (see Robinson and Eller 2005).  I expect that we should see 
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continuity between the problems and solutions, but that there will be no continuity across 
policy subsystems as to which groups set the agenda.  In other words, I expect to see 
problems and solutions resulting from the same interest group sources within subsystems, 
however, I expect to see no continuity in sources across subsystems.  This is consistent 
with the expectations of the disjointed-incremental model which expects to see 
fragmentation of the analytical framework to many partisan participants in policy making 
(Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, 256). And with the expectations of morality policy that 
anticipates greater public participation of less professional actors.   
H1: In subsystems of high uncertainty agenda setting in the policy subsystem will 
be dominated by non-professionals 
The 2002 survey of school superintendents collected data as to the source of problems, 
and solutions for specific challenges addressing the school district.  I asked 
superintendents to identify which groups have actively brought problems to their 
attention and which groups have actively brought specific proposals to their attention.  
The responses to each led to seven categories of groups.  These include: Individual 
teachers, individual parents, teacher organizations, parent organizations, local 
government officials, state government officials, and federal government officials.   
Streams in the Policy System 
To assess the first half of this proposition, I use logit analysis to model the 
probability that a group actively proposed a policy alternative as a function of the groups 
that identified a violence problem.  The results are displayed in table 5.1a-g. 
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Table 5.1a 
Logit Solution Model for Individual Teacher 
 
    
Solution offered by Individual teacher β s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 9.8328 2.9289 0.00
 
Teacher 
Organization 0.6339 0.3080 0.35
 Individual Parent 0.8156 0.2186 0.45
 
Parent 
Organization 1.8844 0.8946 0.18
 Local Official 1.2367 0.3442 0.45
 State Official 0.5045 0.3457 0.32
 Federal Official 1.7915 1.3675 0.45
          
 Log likelihood -236.5454   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 95.1400   
 P  0.0000   
 
Table 5.1b 
Logit Solution Model for Teacher Organization 
 
    
Solution offered by 
Teacher 
Organization 
Odds 
Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 0.5870 0.2911 0.28
 
Teacher 
Organization 9.2010 4.8616 0.00
 Individual Parent 2.2390 1.1889 0.13
 Parent Organization 3.5226 2.0121 0.03
 Local Official 0.5905 0.3135 0.32
 State Official 1.2310 1.2827 0.84
 Federal Official 2.2614 2.5805 0.48
          
 Log likelihood -89.4015   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 38.1600   
 P  0.0000   
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Table 5.1c 
Logit Solution Model for Individual Parent 
 
    
Solution offered by Individual Parent Odds Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 1.2557 0.3666 0.44 
 
Teacher 
Organization 1.3188 0.6189 0.56 
 Individual Parent 7.3974 2.7863 0.00 
 
Parent 
Organization 1.8954 0.8500 0.15 
 Local Official 1.4343 0.4172 0.22 
 State Official 0.7348 0.5426 0.68 
 Federal Official 0.8184 0.7065 0.82 
          
 Log likelihood -197.9876   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 68.9500   
 P  0.0000   
 
Table 5.1d 
Logit Solution Model for Parent Organization 
 
    
Solution offered by 
Parent 
Organization Odds Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 0.3625 0.1703 0.03
 
Teacher 
Organization 1.3426 0.8438 0.64
 Individual Parent 3.6441 1.9970 0.02
 
Parent 
Organization 11.4295 5.9378 0.00
 Local Official 1.5490 0.7253 0.35
 State Official 1.2134 1.3026 0.86
 Federal Official 0.4708 0.6146 0.56
          
 Log likelihood -90.5745   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 41.1900   
 P  0.0000   
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Table 5.1e 
Logit Solution Model for Local Official 
 
    
Solution offered by Local Official Odds Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 0.9910 0.3124 0.98
 
Teacher 
Organization 1.0141 0.5419 0.98
 Individual Parent 1.6482 0.5348 0.12
 
Parent 
Organization 1.1965 0.6262 0.73
 Local Official 14.2631 4.2527 0.00
 State Official 0.1857 0.1389 0.02
 Federal Official 7.8754 6.1989 0.01
          
 Log likelihood -180.5918   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 122.4700   
 P  0.0000   
 
Table 5.1f 
Logit Solution Model for State Official 
 
    
Solution offered by State Official Odds Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified 
by Individual teacher 1.1638 0.4089 0.67
 
Teacher 
Organization 1.5647 0.8303 0.40
 Individual Parent 2.0330 0.7520 0.06
 
Parent 
Organization 1.5371 0.8236 0.42
 Local Official 0.9814 0.3486 0.96
 State Official 6.3139 3.6800 0.00
 Federal Official 2.1250 1.3492 0.24
          
 Log likelihood -158.8792   
 N 464.0000   
 LR χ2(7) 50.8600   
 P  0.0000   
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Table 5.1g 
Logit Solution Model for Federal Official 
 
     
Solution offered by Federal Official Odds Ratio s.e. P 
Problem identified by Individual teacher 1.5700 0.9879 0.47
 Teacher Organization 2.9719 2.2751 0.16
 Individual Parent 2.5487 1.6317 0.14
 Parent Organization 0.1876 0.1960 0.11
 Local Official 1.7695 0.9544 0.29
 State Official 1.6537 1.7001 0.63
 Federal Official 31.0539 31.9890 0.00
          
 Log likelihood -69.64   
 N 462.00   
 LR χ2(7) 66.45   
 P  0.00   
 
The tables overwhelmingly indicate that if a given group identifies a problem that the 
same group also proposes a policy to deal with that problem.  In every model, the highest 
odds favor the group offering the solution.  In a few cases, other groups seem to have a 
bit of an influence; however, these data clearly indicate that the policy stream and 
problem stream are not independent.  These findings strongly suggest that the policy 
system is clearly not as chaotic as Kingdon (1984) would suggest.  In the policy 
subsystem of school violence, policies and problems come from the same source.  It 
could be that Kingdon was half right in that policy entrepreneurs operate in the individual 
coalitions to match problems and policy solutions; however, this is not the only case.  It 
could also be that although problems are coming with solutions, the final policy solutions 
adopted are not distinctively the same as those that accompanied the original problem.  
Problem and policy sources are not the only important issue in the agenda setting and 
policy formulation system, as all sources are not always equal in the eyes of the sovereign 
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decision maker.  The next important issue is which group is most effective in setting the 
agenda of the superintendent. 
Setting the Agenda 
 As I indicate in chapter IV, the policy environment for school superintendents is 
very complex and includes players from local, state and federal levels.  To understand 
how policies are chosen, I model superintendent concern about school violence as a 
function of the groups identifying problems of violence in the school district.  To start, I 
first measure superintendent concern about school violence. 
 I measure superintendent concern about school violence in several ways.  First, I 
asked school superintendents specific questions about their commitment to violence 
programs.  Responses were on a standard five-point Likert scale with 1 representing the 
most negative response and 5 representing the most positive response.  Specifically, I 
asked: 
• “I consider school violence an important problem in my school” 
• “Many people are interested in reducing the potential for violence at my 
school” 
• “I have seen patterns of violence change in my school over the last ten 
years” 
• “I have seen patterns of violence change in my school over the last five 
years” 
• “Our district has drastically increased the resources for reducing violence in 
the past ten years” 
• “Our district has drastically increased resources for reducing violence in the 
past five years” 
• “Our district needs to dedicate more resources to reducing violence” 
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I applied principal components analysis to create a single measure of attention to violence 
in the district.  Not surprisingly, all the questions loaded on the same factor, and only one 
resulting factor had an eigenvalue greater than one.  Factor loadings and scoring 
coefficients can be found in tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.2 
 
Factor Scores for Superintendent Concern about School Violence Variable 
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1  4.16887   3.54373     0.8756 0.8756 
2  0.62513   0.35220     0.01313 1.0069 
3  0.27293   0.29334  0.0573 1.0642 
4 -0.02040   0.06033 -0.0043 1.0599 
5 -0.08074   0.01021 -0.0170 1.0429 
6 -0.09094   0.02254 -0.0191 1.0238 
7 -0.11348    -0.0238 1.0000 
 
Table 5.3 
Factor Loadings for Superintendent Focus 
 
Variable 1 Uniqueness 
Important 0.59852 0.64177 
Interested 0.66891 0.55256 
Patterns Ten 0.85634 0.26668 
Patterns Five 0.84635 0.28370 
Resources Ten 0.83643 0.30039 
Resources Five 0.83625 0.30069 
Reduction Need 0.71739 0.48535 
 
 The first and most obvious criticism of all variables is whether the underlying 
concept is really what I intend to test.  Measuring institutional goals is a problematic 
endeavor at best.  Surveys rarely capture exactly what researchers intend, however, this 
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survey has a number of advantages.  It targets superintendent opinions of institutional 
actions.  While I expect that the measures themselves will not be perfectly accurate in 
relation to the questions asked, I do expect that they will capture what the superintendent 
believes represents the current state of his/her district.  Superintendents have two possible 
motivations in answering these questions.  First they can provide the “correct” answer.  
This is the answer that reflects how they perceive violence to be affecting the district. The 
second possibility is that they are providing what they believe is the correct answer.  That 
is they are answering what “should” be the correct answer based on their beliefs of the 
current socio-political environment.  In either event, the respondents are providing an 
answer about beliefs and not actual events.  In sorting out the underlying covariation, I 
intend to capture the organizational “focus” on the problem as perceived by 
superintendent.  To test this I ran correlations between this measure of attention to 
violence and specific counts of violent acts within the school districts.  This provided no 
support for the assumption that the measure simply captures institutional violence. 
 Using this measure of superintendent attention to violence as a dependent 
variable, I use OLS to assess the impact of the seven different sources of problems on the 
superintendent’s impression of the violence problem in schools.  Because the 
superintendent will also be influenced by actual occurrences of violence as well as 
lobbying efforts in the policy subsystem, I include the measure of school violence created 
in chapter III as a control for school violence.  The results are displayed in table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Regression of Superintendent Attention to Violence 
 
    
Dependent Variable: Superintendent Attention to 
Violence 
Variable β s.e. P 
Individual teacher 0.3645 0.0973 0.00 
Teacher Organization 0.0391 0.1926 0.84 
Individual Parent 0.5411 0.0992 0.00 
Parent Organization 0.2789 0.1909 0.15 
Local Official 0.2392 0.1138 0.04 
State Official -0.1027 0.2332 0.66 
Federal Official 0.3268 0.2643 0.22 
Violence Index -0.0572 0.0380 0.13 
Constant -0.5702 0.0727 0.00 
N 413.00   
F(  8,   404) 13.10   
Prob > F 0.00   
R Squared 0.21   
Root MSE 0.87   
 
Table 5.4 clearly demonstrates that superintendent impression of school violence 
problems are generated by local sources.  This is demonstrated by the positive significant 
coefficients for the individual teachers, parents and local officials.  This is consistent with 
Hess’ (1999) assertion that local sources are most important in the influence of school 
policy, however note entirely expected as recent legislation at the federal level indicates 
that there should be greater federal input.  Also, it is interesting that the agenda is not 
dominated by fixed coalitions as the ACF would suspect, but that the measure of 
individuals is far more influential than that of groups of parents or teachers.  Interestingly 
but not unexpectedly, the violence measure is insignificant in this model.  While at face 
this may seem surprising, recall that the violence measure is a relative measure across 
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school districts.  It is not surprising then to see evidence that the superintendent belief 
about a problem is related to the efforts of subsystem members rather than in reference to 
other subsystems.21  These findings could also indicate another interesting phenomenon 
in the policy subsystem. 
 When evaluating the policy and problem streams, it seems that there are unified 
sources of both.  Interestingly though, while it would seem that the superintendent is 
more influenced by individual parents and teachers, all seven of the sources participate in 
the system.  It would seem that perhaps what is happening in the policy system is that 
while many are jockeying for control of the subsystem, the system itself is narrowing 
down in scope to just a few select groups or players.  Here we see that while participation 
is open to all, only a few are heard.  Those few tend to be individual parents and teachers 
as opposed to organized groups.  This may well indicate a move to stability as described 
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993).   
 Obviously, the participants in this system resemble what would be expected from 
a disjointed-incremental system, but are not quite as chaotic as what we would expect in a 
true “garbage can.”  Are there other similarities in this system and my expectations?  The 
second assumption of a disjointed-incremental system is greater analytical preoccupation 
with the ills to be remedied rather than positive goals to be sought.  Additionally, this 
system expects limited empirical analysis that explores only some, not all, of the possible 
consequences of policy alternatives.   Based on this I expect: 
                                                 
21  The finding of no significance between my violence measure and superintendent perception about 
violence may lead to the faulty conclusion that the measure for violence is simply flawed.  This is not the 
case.  As well as the lack of correlation with my measure, there is no correlation between the 
superintendent perception and any measure of violence.  Correlations between violence counts and rates 
based on the data reported by the school district are all uncorrelated with the superintendent perception 
measure.   
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H2: Systems with higher degrees of uncertainty will show evidence of high 
negative externalities from policy decisions. 
While I can not test this hypothesis directly, I do anticipate that there are some obvious 
goals of organizations that will suffer from the implementation of new goal focused 
programs is systems of uncertainty. 
Implementation and Evaluation 
 Much research has addressed the effect of violence policies on the rate of violence 
(e.g. NBER 2004), and reports of school violence have been gradually reducing for over 
ten years.  For example, The National Center for Education Statistics' indicators of 
School Crime and Safety 2000 reports the number of serious violent crimes and theft has 
declined since 1992 (Kaufman et al. 2000).   Additionally, a survey of students who have 
been victims of school crime and violence showed a decrease from ten percent to eight 
percent since 1995 (Canady, Stark and Naumann 2001; USDOJ 2002).  A study by the 
US Department of Education found that “overall school crime, including theft, rape, 
sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault declined by one third 
between 1992 and 1998 (2002).”  Violence in schools is on the decline; and while I 
certainly do not argue that there is some acceptable level, only that the reductions in 
violence in schools must have opportunity costs.  That is, for the relative increase in 
safety, schools must be giving up some other benefit. 
Schools and the Goals They Face 
 Safety is certainly an important goal for schools, but there are many other goals 
that schools must pursue daily.  Education, social skills, and character building are all 
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outputs I expect from schools.  Tyack and Cuban (1995) identify several different and 
contradictory consumer expectations of schools.  They list: 
To socialize them to be obedient, yet to teach them to be critical thinkers; 
to pass on the best academic knowledge that the past has to offer, yet also 
teach marketable and practical skills; 
to cultivate cooperation, yet to teach students to compete with one another 
in school and later in life; 
to stress basic skills but also encourage creativity and higher-order 
thinking; 
to focus on the academic ‘basics’ but also provide a wide range of choice 
in courses (43). 
 
This list offers just conflicts in education goals.  Schools also face greater and equally 
conflicting goals.  Schools are expected to have both educational and athletic excellence 
(Meier et al. 2005).  Schools are expected to produce active members for the community 
and remain non-partisan in approach.  Schools are expected to instill moral values and 
keep church and state separate.  We expect schools to pursue all these goals 
simultaneously; however, organizations with diverging goals seldom succeed at this task 
(Downs 1967; Rainey 1997).  There is ample evidence to support the notion that schools, 
just like all other organizations, are likely to make tradeoffs between goals (Hess 1999; 
Meier et al. 2004; Tyack and Cuban 1995).  
The Opportunity Costs of Violence Prevention in Schools 
 School violence has several obvious effects.  Students who are afraid are more 
likely to be preoccupied in the classroom, and will lack the focus to concentrate on 
schoolwork.  Worse still, a student who does not survive the school day obviously cannot 
receive a diploma.  Less obvious is the effect that violence prevention programs have on 
school performance.  Paradoxically, violence prevention programs can actually make 
some students feel less secure.  Students may feel that if there is a need for a security 
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policy, then there must be a security problem in the school.  Additionally, locker searches 
and officers in the hallways may seem like an intrusive breach of personal privacy.   
 While these concerns may seem a relatively small price to pay for security, there 
are larger costs to the security programs.  Many programs require extensive staff training, 
taking time away from educators that might otherwise spent on teaching preparation.  
Security programs also drain fiscal resources.  Training programs, new staff, metal 
detectors and new security doors all place a financial burden on schools.  Many of these 
expenditures are not one-time costs either.  Additional staff requires budgeted funds for 
every year as well as provisions for benefits and retirement.  Training programs require 
annual training, expenses for provisions and in some cases travel.  All these costs limit 
the resources that can be dedicated to a school’s primary mission.   I hypothesize that 
increased resource expenditures for violence prevention will negatively influence the 
academic performance of all students, and that minority students will feel a 
disproportionately greater impact of the program effects.    
Modeling the Outcomes of School Violence Policy 
 I model a stock education production function against various indicators of school 
performance using a robust regression (weighted least squares).  This is an iterative form 
of linear regression that progressively down-weights the impact of outliers (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1998).22  This is done to identify the typical effect of increased attention to 
school violence on competing school goals.  Robust standard errors with traditional OLS 
is the most common approach to this situation; however, I use the weighted least squares 
                                                 
22 The robust regression estimates are produced in Stata/SE.  This particular program first generates 
estimates using the Huber weights (Huber 1964), then uses biweights (Beaton and Tukey 1974; Stata Corp. 
2001).  
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for several reasons.  First and foremost, weighted least squares produce a different 
coefficient based on the reduced impact of outliers.  In other words, this procedure better 
estimates the median cases in comparison to traditional OLS.  This is important because 
robust standard errors adjust the standard error of the estimate without adjusting the 
estimate of the slope, so the correction improves the reliability of the hypothesis test, but 
does not adjust the estimate. 
Dependent Variables 
 As previously noted, schools have multiple goals.  The most obvious goals of 
schools all have to do with scholastic performance.  I include three measures of academic 
performance for the districts; average SAT scores, average ACT scores and Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills [TAAS] test pass rates.  The SAT and ACT are tests are 
college admissions tests and are taken only by students who intend to go to college.  
Because the sample subjects for these measures are self-selected, I expect these two 
measures to reflect the top performers in the school.  Additionally, because the tests in 
this case are designed to measure variance in the higher percentiles, there is a minimum 
of variance available.   
 The TAAS test is a measure of basic scholastic skills mandated by the state of 
Texas.  Students take the TAAS exam at several different points in their academic career 
in Texas.  This indicator is the percentage of students who pass all parts of the TAAS 
exam in each school district.  In addition to the scholastic performance measures, I 
include an attendance measure.  This measure is a mean percentage of students who 
attend class on any given day. 
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Independent Variables 
 The key variable in question in this model is the superintendent perceptions of 
violence as a problem in the school district.  All additional variables in this model are 
strictly for control purposes.   
Control Variables 
There are several important factors in predicting school performance. To ensure 
that any and all organizational constraints are accounted for, I include a several indicators 
of school district environmental constraints and organizational resources.  The first are 
the percentages of minority students in the district.  Minority students do not perform as 
well as Anglo students on measures of academic performance (Meier et al. 2002; Jencks 
and Philips 1998; Meier and Stewart 1991); therefore, I include the percentage of Black 
and the percentage of Latino students for each school district. 
A second major factor in student performance is poverty.  Students who are from 
poor families are handicapped in several ways.  They will lack resources at home that 
would otherwise enhance performance. They also are more likely to have unstable 
families, be from single parent homes or even homeless. These factors will negatively 
impact student performance (Necochea and Cune 1996), and in turn, affect the district.  
Additionally, poverty is highly correlated with violence in society (USDOJ 2002). 
Available resources are important to a school’s ability to educate children.  To 
control for the possible differences between schools I include measures of instructional 
expenditures per student and state aid to the school. Incoming resources are not the only 
limits on resources in schools.  Specialized learning programs draw resources away from 
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the general population and focus them on specific groups.  I control for this by including 
measures of students in bilingual education programs and gifted programs.   
Education performance should also be a function of the teaching staff.  Schools 
that pay more to the teachers should be able to attract better teachers.  Additionally, 
teachers with more experience should be more able than their junior counterparts to 
convey information to the students.  I control for teacher experience and quality by 
including the average teacher salary and percent of teachers with five or more years 
experience. 
Finally, a major prerequisite for learning in school is actually being in school.  
Students that attend class must perform better than those who do not.  For this reason, I 
include an attendance measure of the average percent of students attending class on any 
given day.23 Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are available in 
Table 5.5. 
Results 
 The first important step in assessing the impact of multiple goals is to establish a 
baseline relationship between the variables of interest.  I model the education production 
function against each dependent variable to identify the correlation between attention to 
violence and scholastic performance.  I find no statistically significant correlation 
between ACT and SAT scores and attention to violence in schools using traditional OLS.   
 
 
                                                 
23 I exclude this variable from the model where attendance is the dependent variable for obvious reasons. 
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Table 5.5 
Summary Statistics for Superintendent Model 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
% Black Students 8.07 12.13 
% Latino Students 27.15 26.73 
% Students low income 46.78 19.29 
% Students in bilingual programs 5.81 9.33 
% Students in gifted programs 7.58 3.73 
Attendance rate 95.87 .95 
TAAS all students 80.09 9.76 
TAAS Black students 64.34 14.35 
TAAS Latino students 71.50 12.59 
TAAS White students 86.02 7.88 
Mean SAT 973.44 70.15 
Mean ACT 19.87 1.67 
Average teacher salary  32127.49 2233.35 
Student teacher ratio 12.93 2.45 
Teacher experience 11.77 2.26 
% Teachers w/ advanced degrees 20.55 10.29 
% Funding from state 54.01 22.65 
Expenditures per student 3314.08 817.34 
Violence focus measure  7.19 e-10 .97 
 
Not finding correlation between these indicators of top performing students and 
attention to violence in schools could have several possible meanings.  First, because 
these tests are designed to capture variance at the top of the distribution, there is simply 
not enough variance overall to reflect an underlying relationship.   This could also mean 
simply that students who have suffered from the shift of academic focus have opted not 
to take the test.  Alternatively, it could be that the top performers in the school are 
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shielded from the negative effects of goal conflict by being a part of a sheltered group.  
This would include honors programs and gifted programs that are competing goals with 
violence reduction.  I suspect that specialized goals such as these would be the last to 
suffer ill-effects from organizational goal conflict.  Programs that should be more likely 
to suffer would be the general academic focus.  This is because the general academic 
achievement of the school is a more varied and diverse goal than the specialized honors 
programs. 
Next, I evaluate attendance as a function of violence programs and our production 
function.  Logically, students who do not feel safe in school are going to be more likely 
to attend if they believe the environment is safe.  I am suggesting that districts that have 
shifted focus and resources to violence programs are going to spend less time and money 
on programs that attract students to school.  If students do not feel safe, they will not 
attend school.  However, students who do not enjoy school are less likely to attend than 
those who do.  If the student has no concerns for safety, then lack of friends or meaning 
in the school will motivate a student to skip from time to time (Maslow 1987).  Table 
5.6a shows a negative, significant relationship between attention to violence and average 
attendance rates in schools.  As I suspect, shifting attention to more basic needs (safety) 
may cause students to become disinterested in the goings on in schools. 
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Table 5.6a 
The Impact of Violence Prevention Spending on School Attendance 
 
Dependent Variable = Student Attendance 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
 
Violence Prevention (k)  -.1425
 
*** 
 
Control Variables: 
 
 
Percent Black 
 
-.0081** 
Percent Latino 
 
.0047* 
Low Income 
 
-.0203*** 
Gifted 
 
.0078 
Teacher Salary (k) 
 
-.0001** 
Class Size 
 
-.0676** 
Percent Teachers with     
Advanced Degrees     
 
-.0006 
Teacher Experience 
 
.0779*** 
State Aid 
 
.0045** 
Instructional Funds (k) 
 
.0002*** 
Constant 
 
97.4589*** 
F                        
17.18     
Prob > F   .0000 
N                        
415 
Robust regression estimates 
*** Significant at the .01 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
    * Significant at the .1   level 
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Shifting focus to the more general goal of district academic achievement, I modeled pass 
rates on the TAAS exam using our education production function and a weighted least 
squares model.  I first evaluate the pass rates for all students, and then examine pass rates 
by ethnicity group.  I limit the ethnic groups to Black and Hispanic as these are the only 
race/ethnicity groups with sufficient variance in the sample.  I do not address the effect of 
violence on white students because it is reasonable to suspect the effect on white students 
will closely mirror the general population except in districts with high minority 
populations.  The results of these models are displayed in Tables 5.6 b-d.  
For the general population, I find that attention to violence reduces the overall 
pass rate controlling for all other influences.  That is, the more districts divert attention to 
violence programs, the more the basic academic achievement of the school suffers.  More 
interestingly, although the relationship between these variables is strong, the size of the 
coefficient increases as I move through populations.  The violence program indicator has 
a coefficient of -.9988 for the general population, -1.0723 for Latino students, and  -
1.8955 for Black students.  These figures certainly provide some support for the 
hypothesis that varying groups feel disparate effects of programs implemented in schools.  
Additionally, examining confidence intervals around the estimates shows that the slope 
for violence in the general population is bounded at a 95% confidence interval at -1.6676 
and -.3299.  Finally, I should note that there is a significant positive relationship between 
attendance and performance.  There is a good chance that this may indicate a spurious 
relationship.  It could be that attendance and attention to violence are functions of one 
another or some third variable.  I suspect that if this were the case I would see more 
traditional signs of collinearity in the models.   
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Table 5.6b 
The Impact of Violence Prevention on TAAS Scores 
Dependent Variable = TAAS Score, All Students 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
 
Violence Prevention   -.9988 
 
** 
 
Control Variables: 
 
 
Percent Black 
 
-.2143*** 
Percent Latino 
 
-.1254*** 
Low Income 
 
-.1055*** 
Gifted 
 .0723 
 
Attendance 
 
2.5190*** 
Teacher Salary (k) 
 .0005
* 
Class Size 
 
 .3210 
Percent Teachers with     
Advanced Degrees     
 
.0132
 
Teacher Experience 
 
-.0347 
State Aid 
 
-.0174 
Instructional Funds (k) 
 
 .0017** 
Constant 
 
            -176.6380** 
F                         
44.00 
Prob > F   .0000 
N                       
414 
Robust regression estimates 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
  ** Significant at the .01   level 
    * Significant at the .05   level 
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Table 5.6c 
The Impact of Violence Prevention on Black Students’ TAAS Scores 
 
Dependent Variable = TAAS Score, Black Students Only 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
 
Violence Prevention  -1.8955
 
** 
 
Control Variables: 
 
 
Percent Black 
 
-.1031 
Percent Latino 
 
.0217 
Low Income 
 
-.1031 
Gifted 
 
.2448 
Attendance 
 
1.8847 
Teacher Salary (k) 
 
.0008 
Class Size 
 
1.1170* 
Percent Teachers with     
Advanced Degrees     
 
-.8644 
Teacher Experience 
 
-.0866 
State Aid 
 
.0266 
Instructional Funds (k) 
 
-.0020 
Constant 
 
-137.1253 
F            
4.02 
Prob > F    .0000 
N            
268 
Robust regression estimates 
*** Significant at the .01 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
    * Significant at the .1   level 
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Table 5.6d 
The Impact of Violence Prevention on Latino Students’ TAAS Scores 
 
Dependent Variable = TAAS Score, Latino Students Only 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
 
Violence Prevention  -1.0723
 
* 
Control Variables: 
 
 
Percent Black 
 
-.0999*   
Percent Latino 
 
-.0972*** 
Low Income 
 
-.0462 
Gifted 
 
.1812 
Attendance 
 
2.4078*** 
Teacher Salary (k) 
 
.0011*** 
Class Size 
 
.4952 
Percent Teachers with     
Advanced Degrees     
 
-.0601 
Teacher Experience 
 
.0892 
State Aid 
 
.0297 
Instructional Funds (k) 
 
.0006 
Constant 
 
-201.0607*** 
F            
7.86 
Prob > F    .0000 
N            
379 
Robust regression estimates 
*** Significant at the .01 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
    * Significant at the .1   level 
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It is clear that when a school district shifts its attention to violence, student performance 
suffers.  These models also suggest that minority students may suffer a disproportionate 
share of the negative effects.  
 Clearly this system demonstrates significant negative externalities from the policy 
choices.  This is to be expected based on my second hypothesis, but why are these 
externalities persistent?  Perhaps the problem is that in subsystems of high uncertainty, 
the problems with intertwining goals and values with empirical evaluation leads the non-
professional participants in the system to a subjective finding of success instead of 
success gauged by objective criteria.  This idea mates nicely with Meier’s (1993) 
contention that individuals do not tend to take the perceived negative side of an issue area 
in areas of morality politics.  This would indicate that: 
H3: In areas of high uncertainty, outcomes are less important that actions  
This is to say that in systems where uncertainty is high, non-professionals will be pleased 
by the appearance of outcomes more than actual measures of outcomes.  To assess this 
contention, it is necessary to examine the actual policy outputs of the systems.    
School Violence Outputs 
 While the preceding models do shed some light on the secondary effects of the 
policy process of school violence, it does not answer one very important question, that is, 
do school violence problems actually reduce violence?  There is a long literature 
addressing this question in the short run, however, the sum total seems to indicate mixed 
results.  While many districts report positive outcomes, numerical support for these 
claims are lacking (see NCES 2005).  The data used in this study are not optimum for 
gaining leverage on this question, as they lack clear times for the policy interventions.  
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This said, we can compare schools that adopt these policies in respect to those that are 
unable to. 
 Tables 5.7a-d compare schools with given violence programs to those that do not.  
Table a compares these groups across the violence level within the school, Table 5.7b 
compares across the community violence, Table 5.7c compares by the percent of students 
that are from low income homes and Table 5.7d compares across the percentage of 
students who are white.  Interestingly, these simple comparisons provide little evidence to 
support the effectiveness of any given program.   
Table 5.7a 
Regression of School Violence with Prevention Programs 
 
Dependent Variable : School Violence Measure 
Variable β s.e. P 
Metal Detectors in Schools -0.1595 0.1827 0.38 
Locker Inspections in Schools 0.1668 0.1223 0.17 
Police Officer In Schools -0.1988 0.1239 0.11 
Student Counseling Programs 0.0992 0.1419 0.49 
Teacher Counseling Programs -0.001 0.12 0.99 
School Response Plans 0.0796 0.1355 0.56 
Community Response Plans -0.3001 0.145 0.04 
Constant -0.0433 0.1313 0.74 
N 413.00   
F(  7,   405) 1.75   
Prob > F 0.10   
R Squared 0.03   
Root MSE 1.12   
 
Table 5.7a indicates that the only program that actually correlates with reduced levels of 
violence within the schools are community response plans.  Strangely, these are programs 
not designed to reduce violence, but to provide comprehensive response to violence.  
Similarly, Table 5.7b compares the effect of these programs in relation to the violence in 
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the surrounding community.  I would expect that if policy adoption was in response to 
violence in the community, there should be correlation between these programs and the 
levels of violence in the surrounding community.   Strangely, Table 5.7b only reveals a 
relationship between police officers in the school and higher levels of community 
violence. 
Table 5.7b 
Regression of Community Crime with Prevention Programs 
 
Dependent Variable: Community Crime Rate 
Variable β s.e. P 
Metal Detectors in Schools 1.5277 2.6770 0.57 
Locker Inspections in Schools -1.3027 1.8525 0.48 
Police Officer In Schools 9.3983 1.8827 0.00 
Student Counseling Programs 1.1226 2.2053 0.61 
Teacher Counseling Programs 2.0668 1.8100 0.25 
School Response Plans 2.0100 2.0851 0.34 
Community Response Plans -2.3161 2.1596 0.28 
Constant 28.0256 1.9971 0.00 
N 455.00   
F(  7,   413) 5.48   
Prob > F 0.00   
R Squared 0.08   
Root MSE 17.85   
 
Table 5.7c examines the relationship between these programs and low income families in 
the district.  As crime increases with poverty, I would expect to see correlation between 
the existence of these programs and larger percentages of low income students.  
Consistent with the previous two tables, there is little in the way of significance to be 
found. What we do see is that community action plans are less frequent in districts with a 
higher percentage of low income families.   
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Table 5.7c 
Regression of Low Income Students with Prevention Programs 
 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Students from Low Income 
Homes 
Variable β s.e. P 
Metal Detectors in Schools -0.5330 3.2779 0.87 
Locker Inspections in Schools -3.6242 2.1746 0.10 
Police Officer In Schools 1.5760 2.2047 0.48 
Student Counseling Programs 0.9322 2.5106 0.71 
Teacher Counseling Programs 1.5502 2.1361 0.47 
School Response Plans -2.8823 2.4011 0.23 
Community Response Plans -4.7116 2.5836 0.07 
Constant 49.8201 2.3312 0.00 
N 421.00   
F(  7,   413) 1.59   
Prob > F 0.14   
R Squared 0.03   
Root MSE 20.20   
 
This is not a surprising finding as it seems to fit well with the political participation 
literature.  Finally, Table 5.7d examines the relationship between these programs and the 
percentage of students who are white.   
 White students reflect more than simply the diversity of the student body.  White 
the percentage of white students correlates roughly with district wealth, and should act as 
a surrogate measure for socioeconomic status in the model.  What this table shows is a 
decrease in police officers stationed in the schools and an increase in locker inspections.  
Each of these four tables show some covariation, but taken as a whole really shed little 
leverage on the question of efficacy of school violence policies.  More interestingly, the 
covariation that does exist would seem to be more consistent with political pressure than 
it would with policy outcomes.   
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Table 5.7d 
Regression of Percent White Students with Prevention Programs 
 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Students who are White 
Variable β s.e. P 
Metal Detectors in Schools -5.1845 4.1595 0.21 
Locker Inspections in Schools 6.1616 2.7594 0.03 
Police Officer In Schools -10.9420 2.7977 0.00 
Student Counseling Programs -2.6345 3.1858 0.41 
Teacher Counseling Programs -0.3419 2.7106 0.90 
School Response Plans 0.9708 3.0469 0.75 
Community Response Plans -0.5509 3.2785 0.87 
Constant 65.9127 2.9582 0.00 
N 421.00   
F(  7,   413) 3.59   
Prob > F 0.00   
R Squared 0.06   
Root MSE 25.64   
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter serves three main functions.  First, it evaluates the state of the school 
violence subsystem in relation to my theoretic expectations.  Next, it identifies who is 
influential in the policy subsystem of school violence.  Finally, it evaluates the outcomes 
of the increasing importance of violence in our schools.  What it does not do is deal with 
the immediate outputs of violence policies.  I will address each of these in order. 
Theoretic Expectations 
 Although this is a large dataset, this chapter serves more as a case study for my 
theoretic expectations about uncertainty in a subsystem.  In this chapter and the previous 
one, I have identified many sources of uncertainty in the subsystem.  Based on this, I 
expect that decision making in this subsystem will certainly be anything but rational-
comprehensive.  While the findings support this, it is interesting that the system itself is 
still far more rational in behavior that Kingdon would suggest.  This chapter certainly 
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demonstrates that this particular subsystem is neither rational-comprehensive, nor 
completely incremental-disjointed.  While this is strong support that a system must lie in 
between these two school of thought, this chapter is certainly not the last word on the 
subject.   
Players in the Subsystem 
 Obviously, individual teachers and parents are paramount in focusing the 
superintendent agenda on school policy.  This is not surprising, and may be indicative of 
a larger problem in the policy subsystem.   Superintendents pay little attention to the 
federal actors in the subsystem.  Perhaps superintendents implement programs based on 
federal recommendations; however, this research suggests that they may not take federal 
appraisals of problems as seriously as concerns raised by local players.  This seems to be 
most serious given the lack of correlation between superintendent concerns about 
violence and the actual level of violence they encounter.  Without unbiased sources of 
information superintendents may implement recommendations that are unwarranted 
given the tradeoffs that must take place in organizations as under-funded as schools. 
 Additional evidence of the over-importance of local players in the policy domain 
of school violence also obtained through the creation of this research is not yet reported 
in this work came to light in the data gathering process.  That is the lack of national data 
available relating to violence in schools.  Currently there is no national reporting center 
for data on violence in schools.  While there are some national surveys mostly sponsored 
by the NBER, no federal agency is tasked with gathering and accumulating data.  Worse 
yet, there has been no standardization across states in relation to measure standards or 
reporting.  Without these measures, superintendents will never have an alternative to the 
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myopic assessment offered by the local community.  This is very important especially 
given the effect this myopic view has on other important school goals. 
School Violence Outcomes 
 The second half of this chapter clearly illustrates the effect of responding to 
violence in schools.  That is as resources are focused on reducing violence, performance 
on standardized tests and other measures of success fall.  This is very important as these 
programs are no being instituted as a function of violence, but a fallacious assumption of 
violence.  While dropping a few percentage points on TAAS pass rates may not be a 
large cost to prevent violence in schools, it is a huge cost in schools where violence is not 
actually a problem.   
Violence Policy Outputs 
 Conspicuously missing from this chapter is an evaluation of the specific outputs 
of policies instituted within schools.  I do not test each specific policy type for two 
reasons: first, because the level of aggregation is not appropriate, and second because I do 
not feel that it is necessary. 
 Because policies are instituted within individual schools, I fear that testing the 
efficacy at the district level would lead to erroneous outcomes.  Conversely, this is not a 
problem when evaluating the superintendent beliefs because these will permeate the 
entire district.  Additionally, as the superintendent perceptions are not correlated with 
violence, the effects of the violence control programs on other district outcome measures, 
there is no trade-off between violence and other programs.  There are just shortcomings 
with other programs.     
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This project began with bold aspirations for understanding extreme violence in 
schools.  Unfortunately the preceding pages do not close the book on the study of school 
violence.  In fact, this work best serves to elucidate the need for continued work in this 
field.  This is not to say that my endeavors have been without benefit.  In fact, during this 
journey, several important aspects of the school violence subsystem have been 
illuminated.  Additionally, the theoretic understanding of why violence occurs and how 
the system copes has been advanced.  This final chapter reviews the contributions of this 
research and elaborates on where the next logical steps should be taken.  I break this 
chapter down into two main sections, the first dealing with the theoretic portion of this 
work and the second addressing the substantive implications in the school violence 
subsystem. 
Theoretic Contribution 
I deal with two theoretic understandings of violence in school.  Directly, I use 
ecological systems theory to gain an expectation of how violence is shaped in schools.   
Ecological Systems Theory 
 This project did not begin with the intention of evaluating ecological systems 
theory.  In fact, I merely present the theory as a base with which to understand violence 
in schools.  Using this theoretic framework was a bit unorthodox as the theory was 
developed for understanding of the individual.  While this is an individual theory, the 
concept itself does not reject the idea of application in aggregate data.  Additionally, 
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Ecological systems theory fits nicely with the application of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993)   
The theory suggests that individual behaviors are the product of multiple, 
overlapping realms of influence.  Each individual is influenced by events in each realm in 
proportionate to the influence of that system (Lewin 1935, 1951; Bronfenbrenner 1977, 
1979; Hobbs 1966; Garbarino 1982; Garbarino et al. 1992).  This would indicate that 
events within the Microsystems would have far more influence to the individual than 
would the other three systems.  If we model the effects of events in each system on an 
individual as a linear function: 
( ) εβββββ +++++= )(4)(3)(2)(10 macroexomesomicroeffectY  
 
Ecological systems theory expects that: 
4321 ββββ >>>  
While my evaluation of this theory is not quite as straight forward as the above, 
my findings support the general hypothesis that events within the microsystem have more 
effect than events within the macrosystem.  This conclusion is based on a rather simple 
set of tests in Chapters II and III.  To examine violence in schools, I first had to create an 
indicator of violence within the school district.  I did this by creating a factor score from 
the base counts of violent incidents within the school district.  This indicator represents a 
relative measure of the violence within each school district.  I then repeated the procedure 
to produce a measure of violence within the community.  The dependent variable used in 
the later chapters is simply the residual variation of the school violence indicator after 
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being regressed on the community violence indicator.  Interestingly, when I compare the 
R-squared statistic between the first regression used to purge the variance in the indicator 
that covaries with the community violence indicator and the later regressions, the 
explanatory power of the community violence is significantly less than that of the school 
factors.   
Table 6.1 
Adjusted R-Square Values for Successive Regression Predicting School Violence 
Indicator 
 
Predictor Adjusted R-Square
Community Violence 0.0551 
School Factors 0.3358 
 
As Table 6.1 clearly shows, the predictive power of the school is far greater than that of 
the community.  Additionally, this test is more conservative than estimating the two sets 
of covariates simultaneously as running the regressions separately means that any 
covariance between the independent variables will be attributed to community effects and 
not to the effect of the schools.   
 Obvious flaws are present in the simplicity of this test.  Specifically, the 
community violence indicator is generated by using adult crime.  I make a leap of faith 
assuming that the juvenile crime rate in any given area will mirror that of the adult.  
Additionally, both the school violence and community violence crime counts are 
inherently flawed.  While these are legitimate criticisms, I contend that these findings are 
robust simply based on the dramatic difference in the magnitude.  Schools can and do 
impact the levels of violence within their walls.  This is what should be theoretically 
expected based both on ecological systems theory and the majority of the institutions 
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literature.  The bottom line is that schools matter.  I am not, however, confident enough in 
these simple models to make statements as to how much schools matter.  While it is 
obvious that the effect is greater than that of the surrounding community, I am not 
convinced that these separate models fully capture the dynamic of the relationship.  In 
fact, I am quite positive that with the given data it is impossible to map out the complete 
roads of causality in this area.  Certainly this topic deserves and will in the future see a 
far more thorough treatment.   
 For this project, it is important to be able to state that schools matter in the area of 
controlling violence.  This finding is important because not only do I find that they 
matter, but they may also be the most important factor. 
Advocacy Coalitions Framework 
 In Chapter IV, I spend a great deal of time mapping out the advocacy coalition 
framework.  This is because if schools matter in the control of violence the next 
important step in evaluating the school violence subsystem is to evaluate how policy is 
made, evaluated and adapted.  I choose the ACF as a theoretic frame for several reasons.  
First, it is developed to examine the interaction between players within the subsystem.  
Second, it is the most intricate treatment of the policy subsystem, and finally because it is 
emphasizes the feedback loop.  Unfortunately, the ACF has several limiting factors for 
application in this type of evaluation. 
 The first major drawback to the ACF is that is was conceived and developed on 
the individual level.  In fact, the ACF is typically used to examine only one subsystem at 
a time.  To data there is a vast literature using the ACF yet it is not routinely used for 
  111 
  
 
aggregate analysis nor for cross subsystem analysis.  This is unfortunate, but expected 
given the nature of the framework. 
 The ACF is a very detailed theoretic framework.  Many shortcomings in literature 
testing the ACF can be attributed to the very soft definitions the framework offers for 
coalitions, and beliefs (Sabatier 2004).  Based on the principles of morality policy, I 
assume away many of the problems which may surround the definitions of beliefs.  
Additionally, I make the assumption that the actors in each of the many school districts 
have homogeneous groupings and similar beliefs.  Obviously, these are both heroic 
assumptions; however, I do not think that they are entirely untenable. 
 A second major drawback to the ACF in this analysis is that it expects a 
subsystem that has been in place for more than a year.  While I argue school violence has 
been around for more than two score years, an important feature to this study is that the 
subsystem currently in place was not in place for this extended time.  The issue of school 
violence was instantaneously redefined following the events at columbine, and at the time 
of this analysis was still very much in flux.  This flaw is the major theoretic contribution 
to this project.   
 In Chapter IV, I hypothesize that when the system is in flux there will be high 
degrees of ambiguity in the subsystem.  I further hypothesize that when there are high 
degrees of ambiguity subsystem decision making will change from a rational process to 
one more similar to a garbage can model.  The evidence in this project supports this 
claim.  Chapter V clearly demonstrates that superintendent opinion is closely linked to 
parent beliefs.  Table 5.4 clearly demonstrates that individual parents have the strongest 
effect on superintendent impressions of violence within the district.  This is followed only 
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by teachers.  What is interesting about this phenomenon is that the superintendent beliefs 
are not correlated with the actual levels of violence within the school.  The feedback loop 
in the system is not transferring correct evaluations of the situation.  Additionally, 
Chapter V also indicates that many of the solutions instituted in schools have no 
discernable effect or are being implemented in areas where there is no problem to begin 
with. 
 Plainly, this evidence shows that there is a high degree of ambiguity in the 
system.  The evidence indicates that there is not a rational decision making and far worse 
not a rational evaluation of the system feedback in the loop.  My claim in Chapter IV is 
that the system would appear more like a garbage can model of decision making 
(Kingdon 1984); however, this is not wholly correct.  Additional evidence indicates that 
while there is no logic in the evaluation of violence as a problem, that the streams of 
problems and policies are not separate.  That is the superintendent is not matching parent 
problems to solutions from other streams.  My assumption is that the process is still one 
of a “garbage can” in that solutions are being paired with problems, but I assume that this 
is happening within the coalition and not in the larger system.  Perhaps then it is better to 
re-label my figure in Chapter IV from assuming a continuum between multiple streams 
and punctuated equilibrium to simply one between bounded rationality and rationality.  It 
would seem though that my assumptions are correct that in the case of school violence 
we have a system that acts in an irrational manner due to the high degree of ambiguity in 
the system.  Problem identifiers are matching solutions to problems without rationally 
identifying the system or evaluating the effectiveness of the system.   
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 A major problem with the assessment of policy today is the huge number of 
theories (McCool 1997), variables (Meier 2000), and areas covered by this 
interdisciplinary field of study (Sabatier 1999).  We work in an area where we have 
multiple lower level theories with no overarching theory or overarching theory that is too 
general.  Worse yet, we evaluate these theories in an environment governed by 
professional norms that are counterproductive to incremental advancement. 
 There are few journals that offer a scholarly outlet for public policy and even 
fewer that are considered to be of any quality.  The journals that do exist place far more 
value on revelation than refinement.  Because academic success is gauged weighted more 
heavily for publications than other forms of professional development, success is most 
easily obtained through proliferation rather than originality.  Certainly, I am being a bit 
too general here; however, there are far more researchers who have risen in our ranks via 
reiteration rather than by having substantive contributions.    
Strangely, in a quest for a more scientific approach to the study of policy, we as a 
discipline reward dynamic change instead of incremental.  By evaluating a policy system 
during an exogenous shock using the ACF I do exactly what the ACF is not meant to do.  
I do this intentionally because the first step in answering Meier’s call for reducing the 
number of variables in the study of policy and to begin to reach for midlevel and higher 
theory is to push the limits of existing theories.  While there have been volumes of 
manuscripts written testing and reaffirming the ACF theory, the vast majority of these 
papers test this in the same manner as it was originally developed.   
 At the end of the day, the major theoretical contribution from this manuscript is 
that the ACF can and should be developed into a more flexible system.  This tome does 
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not adequately test many of my propositions concerning the ACF, but it does demonstrate 
that it can be done.  The next step in the evolution of the systems theory school of 
thought will be to push these boundaries of the ACF to allow for more rigorous tests of 
its hypotheses and generation of new adaptive ones.  While this infinitesimal, incremental 
step for the ACF is both interesting and important, the real thrust of this manuscript 
concerns violence in schools and how it is dealt with. 
Substantive  
 This book deals with a very important question, how do we make schools safe for 
our children?  What I find is that we still do not know.  Violence becomes a priority for 
the district when parents and teachers become concerned with the problem.  
Unfortunately, it would seem from the evidence in the preceding chapter, that parental 
and teacher violence appraisals are based more on anecdotal evidence or perhaps media 
exposure than actual levels of violence within the school.  Additionally, the data at hand 
show no effect of those policies adopted.  In fact, the only effects of the anti-violence 
policies detected in this study are negative effects on school performance measures.  
These secondary effects seem a high price to pay for peace of mind from a fictional 
problem, and an inequitable price to pay for minorities to boot.  By “fictional problem” I 
do not mean to day that there is no such problem as school violence, only that when 
problem identification is a function of individuals intimate to the school, often the 
evaluation is subjective instead of objective. 
 Substantively, this study does more than just identify the problems with the 
system, and that is it highlights the greatest problems in the policy process.  In the case of 
this policy arena, the largest limitation is that of information.  As stated earlier, there is 
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no existing national system for tracking violence in American schools.  A large part of 
the reason no national tracking exists is due to the history of schools in America.  For the 
most part, schools have always been a function of the state and local governments and 
even now Federal involvement is only marginal (see Chapter II).  Although the past two 
presidents have made education and safety in schools a corner stone of their respective 
campaigns, no real effort has been made to tackle the actual problem.  Without good data, 
policy effects can never be honestly evaluated and thus, there is no ability to refine the 
policies meant to cope with this problem. 
 A second reason for the lack of systematic data on this problem stem from the 
nature of the problem.  As I pointed out in Chapter I, much of the work in this area is 
normative in nature.  That is to say that the majority of research is descriptive in nature.  
Because this is an area of morality, the emotions elicited by the slaughter of the young 
tend to trump dispassionate systematic evaluation.   
 Finally, what data do exist are maintained on the state level.  Currently, not all 
states track violence in schools and those that do are not working with common 
measures.  This means that those data that do exist are not comparable and cannot be 
used to compare across systems.  While some states do have comparable numbers, many 
do not maintain the data in a usable format.  This dramatically raises the cost of access.  
Other states are simply not willing to release this type of data for fear of “airing dirty 
laundry.”  Those states that do, frequently suffer for their good efforts.  For instance, 
Texas and Florida are both very responsive to data requests.  Both even have a large sum 
of the data available on line.  Because Texas education data is so readily available, 
bureaucrats in the Texas Education Agency had to suffer an unrelenting onslaught of 
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criticism during the 2000 presidential elections as then Governor Bush was a candidate 
with a platform that covered education.  The real question should not have been whether 
education in Texas was poor, but if it was really any worse than any other state that does 
not provide performance measures for comparison purposes.  Often, when you are the 
only visible target you get shot!  The state of Texas and the Texas Education Agency 
should be praised for their openness and should be held as a model for other states to 
follow.    But, basically, until there is centralization over monitoring and regulation of 
this problem area, research will be limited to small samples with only poor findings.  
 Centralization of this problem area will do more than just provide comprehensive 
data, it will also remove some degree of subjectivity from the evaluation of the problem.  
Participatory government is certainly a good thing, however, too much of a good thing is 
not always great.  Like many policy areas, violence in schools is one where zero 
tolerance is the only acceptable answer, but we are not dealing with an environment of 
certainty.  School violence and extreme school violence is merely a game of probability 
at which we are working on the extreme margin.  The actual probability of death or 
extreme violence in the average school is infinitesimal.  If we select on a few criteria 
such as urban and low income, the probability increases, but only marginally.  The real 
question here should be the trade-off between the probability of violence and the 
probability of success in academics.  This is an important trade-off, because lack of 
functional skills can be as devastating to an individuals’ future as a gunshot.   
 While violence is appalling, the nation’s schools are heading in the right direction.  
What is interesting about this work is that none of this change can be attributed to the 
policies specifically targeting violence.  Perhaps the renewed vigor in educational 
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attainment highlighted by the Clinton and Bush II administrations have had positive 
externalities with violence as well.  Unfortunately, until there are national aggregate data 
for this we will never be sure.  In the closing, though, this manuscript offers more than a 
simple argument against policies to prevent violence.   
 First, theory in public policy is stagnant and will remain so until the incentive 
structure and participants in the system evolve.  It is a shame that significance tests are 
rewarded over creativity.  Subsystems have evolved, and the ACF is a nice heuristic for 
the process.  This evolution must and can continue.  We can build higher level theories by 
incorporating many of our current models.  My limited blend of the ACF and PE is only a 
beginning.  We need to understand that the openness of systems to the environment goes 
beyond the ACF and in only scratched in the networking literature.  We need to devise 
falsifiable hypotheses and test these midrange theories in and across multiple policy 
arenas. 
 Second, and most importantly, schools and teachers have many problems.  Chief 
among these problems is a reactionary approach to policy.  Perhaps instead of asking 
schools to do more with less, we should reverse this trend.  Perhaps we should expect 
smart kids from schools and not good citizens, great athletes, or broad-minded activists.  I 
would say that the most important fact in this paper is not that the policies do not help, 
but that they hurt.  And the force driving this hurt is begins at the local level.             
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